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Abstract
We study selective monitors for labelled Markov chains. Monitors observe the outputs that are
generated by a Markov chain during its run, with the goal of identifying runs as correct or faulty.
A monitor is selective if it skips observations in order to reduce monitoring overhead. We are
interested in monitors that minimize the expected number of observations. We establish an
undecidability result for selectively monitoring general Markov chains. On the other hand, we
show for non-hidden Markov chains (where any output identifies the state the Markov chain is
in) that simple optimal monitors exist and can be computed efficiently, based on DFA language
equivalence. These monitors do not depend on the precise transition probabilities in the Markov
chain. We report on experiments where we compute these monitors for several open-source
Java projects.
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1 Introduction
Consider an MC (Markov chain) whose transitions are labelled with letters, and a finite
automaton that accepts languages of infinite words. Computing the probability that the
random word emitted by the MC is accepted by the automaton is a classical problem at the
heart of probabilistic verification. A finite prefix may already determine whether the random
infinite word is accepted, and computing the probability that such a deciding finite prefix is
produced is a nontrivial diagnosability problem. The theoretical problem we study in this
paper is how to catch deciding prefixes without observing the whole prefix; i.e., we want to
minimize the expected number of observations and still catch all deciding prefixes.
Motivation. In runtime verification a program sends messages to a monitor, which decides
if the program run is faulty. Usually, runtime verification is turned off in production code
because monitoring overhead is prohibitive. QVM (quality virtual machine) and ARV
(adaptive runtime verification) are existing pragmatic solutions to the overhead problem,
which perform best-effort monitoring within a specified overhead budget [1, 3]. ARV relies
on RVSE (runtime verification with state estimation) to also compute a probability that
the program run is faulty [21, 15]. We take the opposite approach: we ask for the smallest
overhead achievable without compromising precision at all.
1 Work supported by EPSRC grant EP/R012261/1.
2 Work supported by a Royal Society University Research Fellowship.
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Previous Work. Before worrying about the performance of a monitor, one might want to
check if faults in a given system can be diagnosed at all. This problem has been studied
under the term diagnosability, first for non-stochastic finite discrete event systems [19],
which are labelled transition systems. It was shown in [14] that diagnosability can be
checked in polynomial time, although the associated monitors may have exponential size.
Later the notion of diagnosability was extended to stochastic discrete-event systems, which
are labelled Markov chains [22]. Several notions of diagnosability in stochastic systems
exist, and some of them have several names, see, e.g., [20, 4] and the references therein.
Bertrand et al. [4] also compare the notions. For instance, they show that for one variant
of the problem (referred to as A-diagnosability or SS-diagnosability or IF-diagnosability) a
previously proposed polynomial-time algorithm is incorrect, and prove that this notion of
diagnosability is PSPACE-complete. Indeed, most variants of diagnosability for stochastic
systems are PSPACE-complete [4], with the notable exception of AA-diagnosability (where
the monitor is allowed to diagnose wrongly with arbitrarily small probability), which can be
solved in polynomial time [5].
Selective Monitoring. In this paper, we seem to make the problem harder: since obser-
vations by a monitor come with a performance overhead, we allow the monitor to skip
observations. In order to decide how many observations to skip, the monitor employs an
observation policy. Skipping observations might decrease the probability of deciding (whether
the current run of the system is faulty or correct). We do not study this tradeoff: we
require policies to be feasible, i.e., the probability of deciding must be as high as under the
policy that observes everything. We do not require the system to be diagnosable; i.e., the
probability of deciding may be less than 1. Checking whether the system is diagnosable is
PSPACE-complete ([4], Theorem 8).
The Cost of Decision in General Markov Chains. The cost (of decision) is the number
of observations that the policy makes during a run of the system. We are interested in
minimizing the expected cost among all feasible policies. We show that if the system is
diagnosable then there exists a policy with finite expected cost, i.e., the policy may stop
observing after finite expected time. (The converse is not true.) Whether the infimum cost
(among feasible policies) is finite is also PSPACE-complete (Theorem 14). Whether there
is a feasible policy whose expected cost is smaller than a given threshold is undecidable
(Theorem 15), even for diagnosable systems.
Non-Hidden Markov Chains. We identify a class of MCs, namely non-hidden MCs, where
the picture is much brighter. An MC is called non-hidden when each label identifies the state.
Non-hidden MCs are always diagnosable. Moreover, we show that maximally procrastinating
policies are (almost) optimal (Theorem 27). A policy is called maximally procrastinating
when it skips observations up to the point where one further skip would put a decision
on the current run in question. We also show that one can construct an (almost) optimal
maximally procrastinating policy in polynomial time. This policy does not depend on the
exact probabilities in the MC, although the expected cost under that policy does. That is, we
efficiently construct a policy that is (almost) optimal regardless of the transition probabilities
on the MC transitions. We also show that the infimum cost (among all feasible policies) can
be computed in polynomial time (Theorem 28). Underlying these results is a theory based
on automata, in particular, checking language equivalence of DFAs.
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Experiments. We evaluated the algorithms presented in this paper by implementing them
in Facebook Infer, and trying them on 11 of the most forked Java projects on GitHub. We
found that, on average, selective monitoring can reduce the number of observations to a half.
2 Preliminaries
Let S be a finite set. We view elements of RS as vectors, more specifically as row vectors.
We write 1 for the all-1 vector, i.e., the element of {1}S . For a vector µ ∈ RS , we denote by
µT its transpose, a column vector. A vector µ ∈ [0, 1]S is a distribution over S if µ1T = 1.
For s ∈ S we write es for the (Dirac) distribution over S with es(s) = 1 and es(t) = 0
for t ∈ S \ {s}. We view elements of RS×S as matrices. A matrix M ∈ [0, 1]S×S is called
stochastic if each row sums up to one, i.e., M1T = 1T.
For a finite alphabet Σ, we write Σ∗ and Σω for the finite and infinite words over Σ,
respectively. We write ε for the empty word. We represent languages L ⊆ Σω using
deterministic finite automata, and we represent probability measures Pr over Σω using
Markov chains.
A (discrete-time, finite-state, labelled) Markov chain (MC) is a quadruple (S,Σ,M, s0)
where S is a finite set of states, Σ a finite alphabet, s0 an initial state, and M : Σ→ [0, 1]S×S
specifies the transitions, such that
∑
a∈ΣM(a) is a stochastic matrix. Intuitively, if the
MC is in state s, then with probability M(a)(s, s′) it emits a and moves to state s′. For
the complexity results in this paper, we assume that all numbers in the matrices M(a) for
a ∈ Σ are rationals given as fractions of integers represented in binary. We extend M to
the mapping M : Σ∗ → [0, 1]S×S with M(a1 · · · ak) = M(a1) · · ·M(ak) for a1, . . . , ak ∈ Σ.
Intuitively, if the MC is in state s then with probability M(u)(s, s′) it emits the word u ∈ Σ∗
and moves (in |u| steps) to state s′. An MC is called non-hidden if for each a ∈ Σ all non-zero
entries of M(a) are in the same column. Intuitively, in a non-hidden MC, the emitted letter
identifies the next state. An MC (S,Σ,M, s0) defines the standard probability measure Pr
over Σω, uniquely defined by assigning probabilities to cylinder sets {u}Σω, with u ∈ Σ∗, as
follows:
Pr({u}Σω) := es0M(u)1T
A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) is a quintuple (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) where Q is a finite
set of states, Σ a finite alphabet, δ : Q×Σ→ Q a transition function, q0 an initial state, and
F ⊆ Q a set of accepting states. We extend δ to δ : Q× Σ∗ → Q as usual. A DFA defines a
language L ⊆ Σω as follows:
L := {w ∈ Σω | δ(q0, u) ∈ F for some prefix u of w }
Note that we do not require accepting states to be visited infinitely often: just once suffices.
Therefore we can and will assume without loss of generality that there is f with F = {f}
and δ(f, a) = f for all a ∈ Σ.
For the rest of the paper we fix an MCM = (S,Σ,M, s0) and a DFA A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ).
We define their composition as the MC M × A := (S × Q,Σ,M ′, (s0, q0)) where
M ′(a)((s, q), (s′, q′)) equals M(a)(s, s′) if q′ = δ(q, a) and 0 otherwise. Thus, M and
M×A induce the same probability measure Pr.
An observation o ∈ Σ⊥ is either a letter or the special symbol ⊥ 6∈ Σ, which stands for
‘not seen’. An observation policy ρ : Σ∗⊥ → {0, 1} is a (not necessarily computable) function
that, given the observations made so far, says whether we should observe the next letter. An
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observation policy ρ determines a projection piρ : Σω → Σω⊥: we have piρ(a1a2 . . . ) = o1o2 . . .
when
on+1 =
{
an+1 if ρ(o1 . . . on) = 1
⊥ if ρ(o1 . . . on) = 0
for all n ≥ 0
We denote the see-all policy by •; thus, pi•(w) = w.
In the rest of the paper we reserve a for letters, o for observations, u for finite words,
w for infinite words, υ for finite observation prefixes, s for states from an MC, and q for
states from a DFA. We write o1 ∼ o2 when o1 and o2 are the same or at least one of them
is ⊥. We lift this relation to (finite and infinite) sequences of observations (of the same
length). We write w & υ when u ∼ υ holds for the length-|υ| prefix u of w.
We say that υ is negatively deciding when Pr({w & υ | w ∈ L}) = 0. Intuitively, υ is
negatively deciding when υ is incompatible (up to a null set) with L. Similarly, we say that
υ is positively deciding when Pr({w & υ | w 6∈ L}) = 0. An observation prefix υ is deciding
when it is positively or negatively deciding. An observation policy ρ decides w when piρ(w)
has a deciding prefix. A monitor is an interactive algorithm that implements an observation
policy: it processes a stream of letters and, after each letter, it replies with one of ‘yes’, ‘no’,
or ‘skip n letters’, where n ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
I Lemma 1. For any w, if some policy decides w then • decides w.
Proof. Let ρ decide w. Then there is a deciding prefix υ of piρ(w). Suppose υ is positively
deciding, i.e., Pr({w′ & υ | w′ 6∈ L}) = 0. Let u be the length-|υ| prefix of w. Then
Pr({w′ & u | w′ 6∈ L}) = 0, since υ can be obtained from u by possibly replacing some letters
with ⊥. Hence u is also positively deciding. Since u is a prefix of w = pi•(w), we have that •
decides w. The case where υ is negatively deciding is similar. J
It follows that maxρ Pr({w | ρ decides w}) = Pr({w | • decides w}). We say that a policy ρ
is feasible when it also attains the maximum, i.e., when
Pr({w | ρ decides w}) = Pr({w | • decides w}) .
Equivalently, ρ is feasible when Pr({w | • decides w implies ρ decides w}) = 1, i.e., almost
all words that are decided by the see-all policy are also decided by ρ. If υ = o1o2 . . . is the
shortest prefix of piρ(w) that is deciding, then the cost of decision Cρ(w) is
∑|υ|−1
k=0 ρ(o1 . . . ok).
This paper is about finding feasible observation policies ρ that minimize Ex(Cρ), the expect-
ation of the cost of decision with respect to Pr.
3 Qualitative Analysis of Observation Policies
In this section we study properties of observation policies that are qualitative, i.e., not
directly related to the cost of decision. We focus on properties of observation prefixes that a
policy may produce.
Observation Prefixes.
We have already defined deciding observation prefixes. We now define several other types of
prefixes: enabled, confused, very confused, and finitary. A prefix υ is enabled if it occurs with
positive probability, Pr({w & υ}) > 0. Intuitively, the other types of prefixes υ are defined
in terms of what would happen if we were to observe all from now on: if it is not almost
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sure that eventually a deciding prefix is reached, then we say υ is confused; if it is almost
sure that a deciding prefix will not be reached, then we say υ is very confused; if it is almost
sure that eventually a deciding or very confused prefix is reached, then we say υ is finitary.
To say this formally, let us make a few notational conventions: for an observation prefix υ,
we write Pr(υ) as a shorthand for Pr({uw | u ∼ υ }); for a set Υ of observation prefixes, we
write Pr(Υ) as a shorthand for Pr
(⋃
υ∈Υ{uw | u ∼ υ }
)
. With these conventions, we define:
1. υ is confused when Pr({ υu | υu deciding }) < Pr(υ)
2. υ is very confused when Pr({ υu | υu deciding }) = 0
3. υ is finitary when Pr({ υu | υu deciding or very confused }) = Pr(υ)
Observe that (a) confused implies enabled, (b) deciding implies not confused, and (c) enabled
and very confused implies confused. The following are alternative equivalent definitions:
1. υ is confused when Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, no prefix of υw is deciding }) > 0
2. υ is very confused when υu′ is non-deciding for all enabled υu′
3. υ is finitary when Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, no prefix of υw is deciding or very confused}) = 0
I Example 2. Consider the MC and the DFA depicted here:
s0s1 s2
1
2a
1
2a
1a 12a
1
2b
q0 f
a a b
b
All observation prefixes that do not start with b are enabled. The observation prefixes ab
and ⊥b and, in fact, all observation prefixes that contain b, are positively deciding. For all
n ∈ N we have Pr({w & an | w ∈ L}) > 0 and Pr({w & an | w 6∈ L}) > 0, so an is not
deciding. If the MC takes the right transition first then almost surely it emits b at some
point. Thus Pr({aaa · · · }) = 12 . Hence ε is confused. In this example only non-enabled
observation prefixes are very confused. It follows that ε is not finitary. J
Beliefs.
For any s we write Prs for the probability measure of the MC Ms obtained from M by
making s the initial state. For any q we write Lq ⊆ Σω for the language of the DFA Aq
obtained from A by making q the initial state. We call a pair (s, q) negatively deciding when
Prs(Lq) = 0; similarly, we call (s, q) positively deciding when Prs(Lq) = 1. A subset of S×Q
is called belief. We call a belief negatively (positively, respectively) deciding when all its
elements are. We fix the notation B0 := {(s0, q0)} (for the initial belief ) for the remainder of
the paper. Define the belief NFA as the NFA B = (S ×Q,Σ⊥,∆, B0, ∅) with:
∆((s, q), a) = {(s′, q′) | M(a)(s, s′) > 0, δ(q, a) = q′} for a ∈ Σ
∆((s, q),⊥) =
⋃
a∈Σ
∆((s, q), a)
We extend the transition function ∆ : (S ×Q)× Σ⊥ → 2S×Q to ∆ : 2S×Q × Σ∗⊥ → 2S×Q in
the way that is usual for NFAs. Intuitively, if belief B is the set of states where the product
M×A could be now, then ∆(B, υ) is the belief adjusted by additionally observing υ. To
reason about observation prefixes υ algorithmically, it will be convenient to reason about the
belief ∆(B0, υ).
We define confused, very confused, and finitary beliefs as follows:
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1. B is confused when Prs({uw | ∆(B, u) deciding }) < 1 for some (s, q) ∈ B
2. B is very confused when ∆(B, u) is empty or not deciding for all u
3. B is finitary when Prs({uw | ∆(B, u) deciding or very confused }) = 1 for all (s, q) ∈ B
I Example 3. In Example 2 we have B0 = {(s0, q0)}, and ∆(B0, an) = {(s1, q0), (s2, q0)} for
all n ≥ 1, and ∆(B0, b) = ∅, and ∆(B0, a⊥) = {(s1, q0), (s2, q0), (s2, f)}, and ∆(B0,⊥υ) =
{(s2, f)} for all υ that contain b. The latter belief {(s2, f)} is positively deciding. We have
Prs1({uw | ∆({(s1, q0)}, u) is deciding}) = 0, so any belief that contains (s1, q0) is confused.
Also, B0 is confused as Prs0({uw | ∆({(s0, q0)}, u) is deciding}) = 12 . J
Relation Between Observation Prefixes and Beliefs.
By the following lemma, the corresponding properties of observation prefixes and beliefs are
closely related.
I Lemma 4. Let υ be an observation prefix.
1. υ is enabled if and only if ∆(B0, υ) 6= ∅.
2. υ is negatively deciding if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is negatively deciding.
3. υ is positively deciding if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is positively deciding.
4. υ is confused if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is confused.
5. υ is very confused if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is very confused.
6. υ is finitary if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is finitary.
The following lemma gives complexity bounds for computing these properties.
I Lemma 5. Let υ be an observation prefix, and B a belief.
1. Whether υ is enabled can be decided in P.
2. Whether υ (or B) is negatively deciding can be decided in P.
3. Whether υ (or B) is positively deciding can be decided in P.
4. Whether υ (or B) is confused can be decided in PSPACE.
5. Whether υ (or B) is very confused can be decided in PSPACE.
6. Whether υ (or B) is finitary can be decided in PSPACE.
Proof sketch. The belief NFA B and the MCM×A can be computed in polynomial time
(even in deterministic logspace). For items 1–3, there are efficient graph algorithms that
search these product structures. For instance, to show that a given pair (s1, q1) is not
negatively deciding, it suffices to show that B has a path from (s1, q1) to a state (s2, f) for
some s2. This can be checked in polynomial time (even in NL).
For items 4–6, one searches the (exponential-sized) product ofM and the determinization
of B. This can be done in PSPACE. For instance, to show that a given belief B is confused, it
suffices to show that there are (s1, q1) ∈ B and u1 and s2 such thatM has a u1-labelled path
from s1 to s2 such that there do not exist u2 and s3 such thatM has a u2-labelled path from
s2 to s3 such that ∆(B, u1u2) is deciding. This can be checked in NPSPACE = PSPACE by
nondeterministically guessing paths in the product ofM and the determinization of B. J
Diagnosability.
We call a policy a diagnoser when it decides almost surely.
I Example 6. In Example 2 a diagnoser does not exist. Indeed, the policy • does not decide
when the MC takes the left transition, and decides (positively) almost surely when the MC
takes the right transition in the first step. Hence Pr({w | • decides w}) = Pr(Σ∗{b}Σω) = 12 .
So • is not a diagnoser. By Lemma 1, it follows that there is no diagnoser. J
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Diagnosability can be characterized by the notion of confusion:
I Proposition 7. There exists a diagnoser if and only if ε is not confused.
The following proposition shows that diagnosability is hard to check.
I Theorem 8 (cf. [4, Theorem 6]). Given an MCM and a DFA A, it is PSPACE-complete
to check if there exists a diagnoser.
Theorem 8 essentially follows from a result by Bertrand et al. [4]. They study several
different notions of diagnosability; one of them (FA-diagnosability) is very similar to our
notion of diagnosability. There are several small differences; e.g., their systems are not
necessarily products of an MC and a DFA. Therefore we give a self-contained proof of
Theorem 8.
Proof sketch. By Proposition 7 it suffices to show PSPACE-completeness of checking whether
ε is confused. Membership in PSPACE follows from Lemma 5.4. For hardness we reduce
from the following problem: given an NFA U over Σ = {a, b} where all states are initial
and accepting, does U accept all (finite) words? This problem is PSPACE-complete [16,
Lemma 6]. J
Allowing Confusion.
We say an observation policy allows confusion when, with positive probability, it produces
an observation prefix υ⊥ such that υ⊥ is confused but υ is not.
I Proposition 9. A feasible observation policy does not allow confusion.
Hence, in order to be feasible, a policy must observe when it would get confused otherwise.
In § 5 we show that in the non-hidden case there is almost a converse of Proposition 9; i.e.,
in order to be feasible, a policy need not do much more than not allow confusion.
4 Analyzing the Cost of Decision
In this section we study the computational complexity of finding feasible policies that
minimize the expected cost of decision. We focus on the decision version of the problem: Is
there a feasible policy whose expected cost is smaller than a given threshold? Define:
cinf := inf
feasible ρ
Ex(Cρ)
Since the see-all policy • never stops observing, we have Pr(C• =∞) = 1, so Ex(C•) =∞.
However, once an observation prefix υ is deciding or very confused, there is no point in
continuing observation. Hence, we define a light see-all policy ◦, which observes until the
observation prefix u is deciding or very confused; formally, ◦(υ) = 0 if and only if υ is deciding
or very confused. It follows from the definition of very confused that the policy ◦ is feasible.
Concerning the cost C◦ we have for all w
C◦(w) =
∞∑
n=0
(
1−Dn(w)
)
, (1)
where Dn(w) = 1 if the length-n prefix of w is deciding or very confused, and Dn(w) = 0
otherwise. The following results are proved in the appendix:
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I Lemma 10. If ε is finitary then Ex(C◦) is finite.
I Lemma 11. Let ρ be a feasible observation policy. If Pr(Cρ <∞) = 1 then ε is finitary.
I Proposition 12. cinf is finite if and only if ε is finitary.
I Proposition 13. If a diagnoser exists then cinf is finite.
I Theorem 14. It is PSPACE-complete to check if cinf <∞.
Lemma 10 holds because, inM×A, a bottom strongly connected component is reached
in expected finite time. Lemma 11 says that a kind of converse holds for feasible policies.
Proposition 12 follows from Lemmas 10 and 11. Proposition 13 follows from Propositions 7
and 12. To show Theorem 14, we use Proposition 12 and adapt the proof of Theorem 8.
The main negative result of the paper is that one cannot compute cinf :
I Theorem 15. It is undecidable to check if cinf < 3, even when a diagnoser exists.
Proof sketch. By a reduction from the undecidable problem whether a given probabilistic
automaton accepts some word with probability > 12 . The proof is somewhat complicated.
In fact, in the appendix we give two versions of the proof: a short incorrect one (with the
correct main idea) and a long correct one. J
5 The Non-Hidden Case
Now we turn to positive results. In the rest of the paper we assume that the MC M is
non-hidden, i.e., there exists a function −→· : Σ→ S such that M(a)(s, s′) > 0 implies s′ = −→a .
We extend −→· to finite words so that −→ua = −→a . We write s u−→ to indicate that there is s′
with M(u)(s, s′) > 0.
I Example 16. Consider the following non-hidden MC and DFA:
−→a−→b −→c
1
2b
1
2c
1b
1a
q0 fa, b
c
Σ
B0 := {(−→a , q0)} B2 := ∆(B0,⊥2) = {(−→b , q0), (−→a , f)}
B1 := ∆(B0,⊥) = {(−→b , q0), (−→c , f)} B3 := ∆(B0,⊥2b) = {(−→b , q0), (−→b , f)}
B0 is the initial belief. The beliefs B0 and B1 are not confused: indeed, ∆(B1, b) = {(−→b , q0)}
is negatively deciding, and ∆(B1, a) = {(−→a , f)} is positively deciding. The belief B2 is
confused, as there is no i ∈ N for which ∆(B2, bi) is deciding. Finally, B3 is very confused. J
We will show that in the non-hidden case there always exists a diagnoser (Lemma 23). It
follows that feasible policies need to decide almost surely and, by Proposition 13, that cinf is
finite. We have seen in Proposition 9 that feasible policies do not allow confusion. In this
section we construct policies that procrastinate so much that they avoid confusion just barely.
We will see that such policies have an expected cost that comes arbitrarily close to cinf .
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Language Equivalence.
We characterize confusion by language equivalence in a certain DFA. Consider the belief
NFA B. In the non-hidden case, if we disallow ⊥-transitions then B becomes a DFA B′.
For B′ we define a set of accepting states by FB′ := {(s, q) | Prs(Lq) = 1}.
I Example 17. For the previous example, a part of the DFA B′ looks as follows:
(−→a , q0)(−→b , q0) (−→c , f) (−→a , f) (−→b , f)
b c
b a
c
b
b
States that are unreachable from (−→a , q0) are not drawn here. J
We associate with each (s, q) the language Ls,q ⊆ Σ∗ that B′ accepts starting from initial
state (s, q). We call (s, q), (s′, q′) language equivalent, denoted by (s, q) ≈ (s′, q′), when
Ls,q = Ls′,q′ .
I Lemma 18. One can compute the relation ≈ in polynomial time.
Proof. For any (s, q) one can use standard MC algorithms to check in polynomial time if
Prs(Lq) = 1 (using a graph search in the compositionM×A, as in the proof of Lemma 5.3).
Language equivalence in the DFA B′ can be computed in polynomial time by minimization. J
We call a belief B ⊆ S ×Q settled when all (s, q) ∈ B are language equivalent.
I Lemma 19. A belief B ⊆ S ×Q is confused if and only if there is a ∈ Σ such that ∆(B, a)
is not settled.
It follows that one can check in polynomial time whether a given belief is confused. We
generalize this fact in Lemma 22 below.
I Example 20. In Example 16 the belief B3 is not settled. Indeed, from the DFA in
Example 17 we see that L−→
b ,q0
= ∅ 6= {b}∗ = L−→
b ,f
. Since B3 = ∆(B2, b), by Lemma 19, the
belief B2 is confused. J
Procrastination.
For a belief B ⊆ S×Q and k ∈ N, if ∆(B,⊥k) is confused then so is ∆(B,⊥k+1). We define:
cras(B) := sup{ k ∈ N | ∆(B,⊥k) is not confused } ∈ N ∪ {−1,∞}
We set cras(B) := −1 if B is confused. We may write cras(s, q) for cras({(s, q)}).
I Example 21. In Example 16 we have cras(B0) = cras(−→a , q0) = 1 and cras(B1) = 0 and
cras(B2) = cras(B3) = −1 and cras(−→b , q0) = cras(−→a , f) =∞. J
I Lemma 22. Given a belief B, one can compute cras(B) in polynomial time. Further, if
cras(B) is finite then cras(B) < |S|2 · |Q|2.
Proof. Let k ∈ N. By Lemma 19, ∆(B,⊥k) is confused if and only if:
∃ a.∃ (s, q), (t, r) ∈ ∆(B,⊥k) : s a−→, t a−→, (−→a , δ(q, a)) 6≈ (−→a , δ(r, a))
This holds if and only if there is B2 ⊆ B with |B2| ≤ 2 such that:
∃ a.∃ (s, q), (t, r) ∈ ∆(B2,⊥k) : s a−→, t a−→, (−→a , δ(q, a)) 6≈ (−→a , δ(r, a))
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Let G be the directed graph with nodes in S ×Q× S ×Q and edges
((s, q, t, r), (s′, q′, t′, r′)) ⇐⇒ ∆({(s, q), (t, r)},⊥) ⊇ {(s′, q′), (t′, r′)} .
Also define the following set of nodes:
U := {(s, q, t, r) | ∃ a : s a−→, t a−→, (−→a , δ(q, a)) 6≈ (−→a , δ(r, a))}
By Lemma 18 one can compute U in polynomial time. It follows from the argument above
that ∆(B,⊥k) is confused if and only if there are (s, q), (t, r) ∈ B such that there is a length-k
path in G from (s, q, t, r) to a node in U . Let k ≤ |S × Q × S × Q| be the length of the
shortest such path, and set k := ∞ if no such path exists. Then k can be computed in
polynomial time by a search of the graph G, and we have cras(B) = k − 1. J
The Procrastination Policy.
For any belief B and any observation prefix υ, the language equivalence classes represented
in ∆(B, υ) depend only on υ and the language equivalence classes in B. Therefore, when
tracking beliefs along observations, we may restrict B to a single representative of each
equivalence class. We denote this operation by B↓. A belief B is settled if and only if
|B↓| ≤ 1.
A procrastination policy ρpro(K) is parameterized with (a large) K ∈ N. Define (and
precompute) k(s, q) := min{K, cras(s, q)} for all (s, q). We define ρpro(K) by the following
monitor that implements it:
1. i := 0
2. while (si, qi) is not deciding:
a. skip k(si, qi) observations, then observe a letter ai
b. {(si+1, qi+1)} := ∆((si, qi),⊥k(si,qi)ai)↓;
c. i := i+ 1;
3. output yes/no decision
It follows from the definition of cras and Lemma 19 that ∆((si, qi), υi)↓ is indeed a singleton
for all i. We have:
I Lemma 23. For all K ∈ N the procrastination policy ρpro(K) is a diagnoser.
Proof. For a non-hidden MC M and a DFA A, there is at most one successor for (s, q)
on letter a in the belief NFA B, for all s, q, a. Then, by Lemma 19, singleton beliefs are
not confused, and in particular the initial belief B0 is not confused. By Lemma 4.4, ε is
not confused, which means that Pr({u | u deciding }) = Pr(ε) = 1. Since almost surely a
deciding word u is produced and since ∆(B0, u) ⊆ ∆(B0, υ) whenever u ∼ υ, it follows that
eventually an observation prefix υ is produced such that ∆(B0, υ) contains a deciding pair
(s, q). But, as remarked above, ∆(B0, υ) is settled, so it is deciding. J
The Procrastination MC Mpro(K).
The policy ρpro(K) produces a (random, almost surely finite) word a1a2 · · · an with n =
Cρpro(K). Indeed, the observations that ρpro(K) makes can be described by an MC. Recall
that we have previously defined a composition MCM×A = (S ×Q,Σ,M ′, (s0, q0)). Now
define an MCMpro(K) := (S ×Q,Σ ∪ {$},Mpro(K), (s0, q0)) where $ 6∈ Σ is a fresh letter
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and the transitions are as follows: when (s, q) is deciding then Mpro(K)($)
(
(s, q), (s, q)
)
:= 1,
and when (s, q) is not deciding then
Mpro(K)(a)
(
(s, q), (−→a , q′)) := (M ′(⊥)k(s,q)M ′(a)) ((s, q), (−→a , q′)) ,
where the matrix M ′(⊥) := ∑aM ′(a) is powered by k(s, q). The MC Mpro(K) may not
be non-hidden, but could be made non-hidden by (i) collapsing all language equivalent
(s, q1), (s, q2) in the natural way, and (ii) redirecting all $-labelled transition to a new
state
−→
$ that has a self-loop. In the understanding that $$$ · · · indicates ‘decision made’,
the probability distribution defined by the MC Mpro(K) coincides with the probability
distribution on sequences of non-⊥ observations made by ρpro(K).
I Example 24. For Example 16 the MCMpro(K) for K ≥ 1 is as follows:
(−→a , q0)
1
(−→b , q0)
∞
(−→a , f)
∞
1
2b
1
2a
1$ 1$
Here the lower number in a state indicate the cras number. The left state is negatively
deciding, and the right state is positively deciding. The policy ρpro(K) skips the first
observation and then observes either b or a, each with probability 12 , each leading to a
deciding belief. J
Maximal Procrastination is Optimal.
The following lemma states, loosely speaking, that when a belief {(s, q)} with cras(s, q) =∞
is reached and K is large, then a single further observation is expected to suffice for a decision.
I Lemma 25. Let c(K, s, q) denote the expected cost of decision under ρpro(K) starting in
(s, q). For each ε > 0 there exists K ∈ N such that for all (s, q) with cras(s, q) =∞ we have
c(K, s, q) ≤ 1 + ε.
Proof sketch. The proof is a quantitative version of the proof of Lemma 23. The singleton
belief {(s, q)} is not confused. Thus, if K is large then with high probability the belief
B := ∆({(s, q)},⊥Ka) (for the observed next letter a) contains a deciding pair (s′, q′). But
if cras(s, q) =∞ then, by Lemma 19, B is settled, so if B contains a deciding pair then B is
deciding. J
I Example 26. Consider the following variant of the previous example:
−→a−→b −→c
1
3b
1
3c
1
3a1b 1c
q0 f
a b
c
Σ
The MCMpro(K) for K ≥ 0 is as follows:
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(−→a , q0)
∞
(−→b , q0)
∞
(−→c , f)
∞
1−( 13 )K+1
2 b
1−( 13 )K+1
2 c
1$ 1$
( 13 )K+1a
The left state is negatively deciding, and the right state is positively deciding. We have
c(K,−→b , q0) = c(K,−→c , f) = 0 and c(K,−→a , q0) = 1/(1− ( 13 )K+1). J
Now we can prove the main positive result of the paper:
I Theorem 27. For any feasible policy ρ there is K ∈ N such that:
Ex(Cρpro(K)) ≤ Ex(Cρ)
Proof sketch. Let ρ be a feasible policy. We choose K > |S|2 · |Q|2, so, by Lemma 22,
ρpro(K) coincides with ρpro(∞) until time, say, n∞ when ρpro(K) encounters a pair (s, q)
with cras(s, q) = ∞. (The time n∞ may, with positive probability, never come.) Let us
compare ρpro(K) with ρ up to time n∞. For n ∈ {0, . . . , n∞}, define υpro(n) and υρ(n) as
the observation prefixes obtained by ρpro and ρ, respectively, after n steps. Write `pro(n) and
`ρ(n) for the number of non-⊥ observations in υpro(n) and υρ(n), respectively. For beliefs
B,B′ we write B  B′ when for all (s, q) ∈ B there is (s′, q′) ∈ B′ with (s, q) ≈ (s′, q′). One
can show by induction that we have for all n ∈ {0, . . . , n∞}:
`pro(n) ≤ `ρ(n) and
(
∆(B0, υpro(n))  ∆(B0, υρ(n)) or `pro(n) < `ρ(n)
)
If time n∞ does not come then the inequality `pro(n) ≤ `ρ(n) from above suffices. Similarly, if
at time n∞ the pair (s, q) is deciding, we are also done. If after time n∞ the procrastination
policy ρpro(K) observes at least one more letter then ρ also observes at least one more
letter. By Lemma 25, one can choose K large so that for ρpro(K) one additional observation
probably suffices. If it is the case that ρ almost surely observes only one letter after n∞,
then ρpro(K) also needs only one more observation, since it has observed at time n∞. J
It follows that, in order to compute cinf , it suffices to analyze Ex(Cρpro(K)) for large K.
This leads to the following theorem:
I Theorem 28. Given a non-hidden MC M and a DFA A, one can compute cinf in
polynomial time.
Proof. For each (s, q) define c(K, s, q) as in Lemma 25, and define c(s, q) :=
limK→∞ c(K, s, q). By Lemma 25, for each non-deciding (s, q) with cras(s, q) = ∞ we
have c(s, q) = 1. Hence the c(s, q) satisfy the following system of linear equations where
some coefficients come from the procrastination MCMpro(∞):
c(s, q) =

0 if (s, q) is deciding
1 if (s, q) is not deciding and cras(s, q) =∞
1 + c′(s, q) otherwise
c′(s, q) =
∑
a
∑
q′
Mpro(∞)
(
(s, q), (−→a , q′)) · c(−→a , q′) if cras(s, q) <∞
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By solving the system one can compute c(s0, q0) in polynomial time. We have:
cinf = inf
feasible ρ
Ex(Cρ)
Thm27= lim
K→∞
Ex(Cρpro(K)) = c(s0, q0)
Hence one can compute cinf in polynomial time. J
6 Empirical Evaluation of the Expected Optimal Cost
We have shown that maximal procrastination is optimal in the non-hidden case (Theorem 27).
However, we have not shown how much better the optimal policy is than the see-all baseline.
It appears difficult to answer this question analytically, so we address it empirically. We
implemented our algorithms in a fork of the Facebook Infer static analyzer [8], and applied
them to 11 open-source projects, totaling 80 thousand Java methods. We found that in
> 90% of cases the maximally procrastinating monitor is trivial and thus the optimal cost
is 0, because Infer decides statically if the property is violated. In the remaining cases, we
found that the optimal cost is roughly half of the see-all cost, but the variance is high.
Design. Our setting requires a DFA and an MC representing, respectively, a program
property and a program. For this empirical estimation of the expected optimal cost, the DFA
is fixed, the MC shape is the symbolic flowgraph of a real program, and the MC probabilities
are sampled from Dirichlet distributions.
The DFA represents the following property: ‘there are no two calls to next without an
intervening call to hasNext’. To understand how the MC shape is extracted from programs,
some background is needed. Infer [8, 9] is a static analyzer that, for each method, infers several
preconditions and, attached to each precondition, a symbolic path. For a simple example,
consider a method whose body is ‘if (b)x.next(); if (!b)x.next()’. Infer would generate two
preconditions for it, b and ¬b. In each of the two attached symbolic paths, we can see that
next is not called twice, which we would not notice with a control flowgraph. The symbolic
paths are inter-procedural. If a method f calls a method g, then the path of f will link to
a path of g and, moreover, it will pick one of the paths of g that corresponds to what is
currently known at the call site. For example, if g(b) is called from a state in which ¬b holds,
then Infer will select a path of g compatible with the condition ¬b.
The symbolic paths are finite because abstraction is applied, including across mutually
recursive calls. But, still, multiple vertices of the symbolic path correspond to the same
vertex of the control flowgraph. For example, Infer may go around a for-loop five times before
noticing the invariant. By coalescing those vertices of the symbolic path that correspond to
the same vertex of the control flowgraph we obtain an SFG (symbolic flowgraph). We use such
SFGs as the skeleton of MCs. Intuitively, one can think of SFGs as inter-procedural control
flowgraphs restricted based on semantic information. Vertices correspond to locations in the
program text, and transitions correspond to method calls or returns. Transition probabilities
should then be interpreted as a form of static branch prediction. One could learn these
probabilities by observing many runs of the program on typical input data, for example by
using the Baum–Welch algorithm [17]. Instead, we opt to show that the improvement in
expected observation cost is robust over a wide range of possible transition probabilities,
which we do by drawing several samples from Dirichlet distributions. Besides, recall that the
(optimal) procrastination policy does not depend on transition probabilities.
Once we have a DFA and an MC we compute their product. In some cases, it is clear
that the product is empty or universal. These are the cases in which we can give the verdict
right away, because no observation is necessary. We then focus on the non-trivial cases.
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For non-trivial MC×DFA products, we compute the expected cost of the light see-all
policy Ex(C◦), which observes all letters until a decision is made and then stops. We can do
so by using standard algorithms [2, Chapter 10.5]. Then, we computeMpro, which we use to
compute the expected observation cost cinf of the procrastination policy (Theorem 28). Recall
that in order to computeMpro, one needs to compute the cras function, and also to find
language equivalence classes. Thus, computingMpro entails computing all the information
necessary for implementing a procrastinating monitor.
Methodology. We selected 11 Java projects among those that are most forked on GitHub
(Table 2). We ran Infer on each of these projects. From the inferred specifications, we built
SFGs and monitors that employ light see-all policies and maximal procrastination policies.
From these monitors, we computed the respective expected costs, solving the linear systems
using Gurobi [12]. Our implementation is in a fork of Infer, on GitHub.
Table 1 Reduction in expected observation cost, on real-world data. Each SFG (symbolic
flowgraph) corresponds to one inferred precondition of a method. The size of monitors is measured
in number of language equivalence classes. (LOC = lines of code; GAvg = geometric average.)
Project Size Monitors cinf /Ex(C◦)
Name Methods SFGs LOC Count Avg-Size Max-Size Med GAvg
tomcat 26K 52K 946K 343 69 304 0.53 0.50
okhttp 3K 6K 49K 110 263 842 0.46 0.42
dubbo 8K 16K 176K 91 111 385 0.53 0.51
jadx 4K 9K 48K 204 96 615 0.58 0.50
RxJava 12K 45K 192K 83 41 285 0.52 0.53
guava 22K 43K 1218K 1126 134 926 0.41 0.41
clojure 5K 19K 66K 219 120 767 0.44 0.44
AndroidUtilCode 3K 7K 436K 39 89 288 0.66 0.58
leakcanary 1K 1K 11K 12 79 268 0.66 0.59
deeplearning4j 21K 40K 408K 262 51 341 0.58 0.58
fastjson 2K 7K 47K 204 63 597 0.59 0.53
Results. The results are given in Table 1. We first note that the number of monitors is
much smaller than the number of methods, by a factor of 10 or 100. This is because in
most cases we are able to determine the answer statically, by analyzing the symbolic paths
produced by Infer. The large factor should not be too surprising: we are considering a fixed
property about iterators, not all Java methods use iterators, and, when they do, it is usually
easy to tell that they do so correctly. Still, each project has a few hundred monitors, which
handle the cases that are not so obvious.
We note that cinfEx(C◦) ≈ 0.5. The table supports this by presenting the median and the
geometric average, which are close to each-other; the arithmetic average is also close. There
is, however, quite a bit of variation from monitor to monitor, as shown in Figure 1. We
conclude that selective monitoring has the potential to significantly reduce the overhead of
runtime monitoring.
7 Future Work
In this paper we required policies to be feasible, which means that our selective monitors
are as precise as non-selective monitors. One may relax this and study the tradeoff between
efficiency (skipping even more observations) and precision (probability of making a decision).
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Figure 1 Empirical distribution of cinf /Ex(C◦), across all projects.
Further, one could replace the diagnosability notion of this paper by other notions from the
literature; one could investigate how to compute cinf for other classes of MCs, such as acyclic
MCs; one could study the sensitivity of cinf to changes in transition probabilities; and one
could identify classes of MCs for which selective monitoring helps and classes of MCs for
which selective monitoring does not help.
A nontrivial extension to the formal model would be to include some notion of data, which
is pervasive in practical specification languages used in runtime verification [13]. This would
entail replacing the DFA with a more expressive device, such as a nominal automaton [7], a
symbolic automaton [10], or a logic with data (e.g., [11]). Alternatively, one could side-step
the problem by using the slicing idea [18], which separates the concern of handling data at
the expense of a mild loss of expressive power. Finally, the monitors we computed could be
used in a runtime verifier, or even in session type monitoring where the setting is similar [6].
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A Experimental Details
Table 2 Open Source projects, from GitHub.
Owner Project Description
Apache tomcat Java Servlet, Server Pages, and WebSocket
Square okhttp an HTTP/HTTP2 client for Android
Alibaba dubbo a high-performance RPC framework
Skylot jadx Dex to Java decompiler
ReactiveX RxJava Reactive Extensions for the JVM
Google guava Google core libraries for Java
Clojure clojure the Clojure programming language
Blankj AndroidUtilCode a powerful and easy to use library for Android
Square leakcanary a memory leak detection library for Android
Deeplearning4j deeplearning4j Deep Learning for Java on Hadoop and Spark
Alibaba fastjson a fast JSON parser/generator
B Proofs
B.1 Equivalence of Definitions for Observation Prefixes
Confused. Recall the two definitions for υ confused:
(a) Pr({ υu | υu deciding }) < Pr(υ)
(b) Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, no prefix of υw is deciding }) > 0
If A ⊆ B, then Pr(A) < Pr(B) is equivalent to Pr(B \A) > 0. The plan is to pick A and B
such that definition (a) has the form Pr(A) < Pr(B), and then show that A ⊆ B and that
definition (b) has the form Pr(B \A) > 0.
Pr({ υu | υu deciding })
= Pr
( ⋃
υu
υu deciding
{u′w | u′ ∼ υu }) the Pr(Υ) notation
= Pr({u′w | u′ ∼ υu and υu deciding })
= Pr({uw | u ∼ υ and υw has a deciding prefix })
Thus, we set
A := {uw | u ∼ υ and υw has a deciding prefix }
B := {uw | u ∼ υ }
It is clear that A ⊆ B, and that B \A is the event from definition (b).
Very Confused. Recall the two definitions for υ very confused:
(a) Pr({ υu | υu deciding }) = 0
(b) υu′ is non-deciding for all enabled υu′
To see that (a) implies (b), assume that υu′ is deciding. Because
0 (a)= Pr({ υu | υu deciding }) ≥ Pr(υu′)
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it follows that υu′ is not enabled.
To see that (b) implies (a), recall that observation prefixes are finite, and calculate:
Pr({ υu | υu deciding })
= Pr
( ⋃
υu
υu deciding
{u′w | u′ ∼ υu }) unfold the Pr(Υ) notation
≤
∑
υu
υu deciding
Pr({u′w | u′ ∼ υu }) union bound
=
∑
υu
υu deciding
Pr(υu) fold the Pr(υu) notation
= 0 because Σ∗⊥ is countable, and we assume (b)
Finitary. Recall the two definitions for υ finitary:
(a) Pr({ υu | υu very confused or deciding }) = Pr(υ)
(b) Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, no prefix of υw is deciding or very confused}) = 0
The proof is similar to the confused case. Definition (a) has the form Pr(A) = Pr(B) with
A ⊆ B, and definition (b) has the form Pr(B \ A) = 0. We just need to make the sets
A and B explicit. Below, ‘dv’ stands for ‘deciding or very confused’.
Pr({ υu | υu deciding or very confused })
= Pr
( ⋃
υu
υu dv
{u′w | u′ ∼ υu }) unfold the Pr(Υ) notation
= Pr({u′w | u′ ∼ υu and υu is dv })
= Pr({uw | u ∼ υ and υw has a dv prefix })
So, we pick
A := {uw | u ∼ υ and υw has a dv prefix }
B := {uw | u ∼ υ }
from which A ⊆ B and B \A = {uw | u ∼ υ and uw has no dv prefix }, as desired.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Here is Lemma 4 from the main body:
I Lemma 4. Let υ be an observation prefix.
1. υ is enabled if and only if ∆(B0, υ) 6= ∅.
2. υ is negatively deciding if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is negatively deciding.
3. υ is positively deciding if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is positively deciding.
4. υ is confused if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is confused.
5. υ is very confused if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is very confused.
6. υ is finitary if and only if ∆(B0, υ) is finitary.
Proof. We have:
Pr({w & υ}) =
∑
u∼υ
Pr({u}Σω)
=
∑
u∼υ
∑
s
M(u)(s0, s)
(2)
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Similarly we have:
Pr({w & υ | w ∈ L}) =
∑
u∼υ
Pr({u}Σω ∩ L)
=
∑
u∼υ
∑
s
M(u)(s0, s) · Prs(Lδ(q0,u))
(3)
Further, we have for all B ⊆ S ×Q:
∆(B, υ) =
⋃
u∼υ
∆(B, u)
=
⋃
u∼υ
{(s′, q′) | ∃ (s, q) ∈ B : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, δ(q, u) = q′}
(4)
We prove item 1:
υ is enabled
⇐⇒ Pr({w & υ}) > 0 definition
⇐⇒ ∃u ∼ υ.∃ s with M(u)(s0, s) > 0 by (2)
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ ∆({(s0, q0)}, υ) by (4)
⇐⇒ ∆(B0, υ) 6= ∅ definition
We prove item 2:
υ is negatively deciding
⇐⇒ Pr({w & υ | w ∈ L}) = 0 definition
⇐⇒ ∀u ∼ υ.∀s with M(u)(s0, s) > 0 : Prs(Lδ(q0,u)) = 0 by (3)
⇐⇒ ∀ (s, q) ∈ ∆(B0, υ) : Prs(Lq) = 0 by (4)
⇐⇒ all (s, q) ∈ ∆(B0, υ) are negatively deciding definition
⇐⇒ ∆(B0, υ) is negatively deciding definition
The proof of item 3 is similar. Towards item 4 note that if υ is not deciding then none of its
prefixes is. This property explains the second equivalence in the following proof of item 4.
There we write u′ < w to denote that u′ is a finite prefix of w.
υ is confused
⇐⇒ Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, no prefix of υw is deciding}) > 0 definition
⇐⇒ Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, ∀u′ < w : υu′ is not deciding}) > 0 see above
⇐⇒
∑
u∼υ
∑
s
M(u)(s0, s) · as before
· Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : υu′ is not deciding}) > 0
⇐⇒ ∃u ∼ υ.∃ s : M(u)(s0, s) > 0 and as before
Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : υu′ is not deciding}) > 0
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ ∆(B0, υ) : by (4)
Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : υu′ is not deciding}) > 0
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ ∆(B0, υ) : items 2, 3
Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : ∆(∆(B0, υ), u′) is not deciding}) > 0
⇐⇒ ∆(B0, υ) is confused definition
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We prove item 5:
υ is very confused
⇐⇒ ∀u : (υu is enabled→ υu is not deciding) definition
⇐⇒ ∀u : (∆(B0, υu) 6= ∅ → ∆(B0, υu) is not deciding) items 2, 3
⇐⇒ ∆(B0, υ) is very confused definition
The proof of item 6 is similar to the proof of item 4. We abbreviate “not deciding and not
very confused” to “continuing”. Note that if υ is continuing then all its prefixes are. This
property explains the second equivalence in the following proof of item 6. There we write
u′ < w to denote that u′ is a finite prefix of w.
υ is finitary
⇐⇒ Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, all u′ < υw are continuing}) = 0 definition
⇐⇒ Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, ∀u′ < w : υu′ is continuing}) = 0 see above
⇐⇒
∑
u∼υ
∑
s
M(u)(s0, s) · as before
· Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : υu′ is continuing}) = 0
⇐⇒ ∀u ∼ υ.∀ s : M(u)(s0, s) = 0 or as before
Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : υu′ is continuing}) = 0
⇐⇒ ∀ (s, q) ∈ ∆(B0, υ) : by (4)
Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : υu′ is continuing}) = 0
⇐⇒ ∀ (s, q) ∈ ∆(B0, υ) : items 2, 3, 5
Prs({w | ∀u′ < w : ∆(B0, υu′) is continuing}) = 0
⇐⇒ ∀ (s, q) ∈ ∆(B0, υ) : definitions
Prs({u′w | ∆(∆(B0, υ), u′) is not continuing}) = 1
⇐⇒ ∆(B0, υ) is finitary definition
This proves item 6 and completes the proof of the lemma. J
B.3 Proof of Lemma 5
Here is Lemma 5 from the main body:
I Lemma 5. Let υ be an observation prefix, and B a belief.
1. Whether υ is enabled can be decided in P.
2. Whether υ (or B) is negatively deciding can be decided in P.
3. Whether υ (or B) is positively deciding can be decided in P.
4. Whether υ (or B) is confused can be decided in PSPACE.
5. Whether υ (or B) is very confused can be decided in PSPACE.
6. Whether υ (or B) is finitary can be decided in PSPACE.
Proof. Let G be the following graph:
the set of vertices is S ×Q× P where P is the set of prefixes of υ;
there is an edge (s1, q1, υ1) → (s2, q2, υ2) if and only if υ1 = oυ2 for some o and
∆((s1, q1), o) 3 (s2, q2).
This graph G can be computed in deterministic logspace. Also note that the belief NFA can
be computed in deterministic logspace.
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Proof of item 1.
By Lemma 4.1, we have that υ is enabled if and only if ∆(B0, υ) 6= ∅. We have ∆(B0, υ) 6= ∅
if and only if G has a path from (s0, q0, υ) to a node (s, q, ε). But graph reachability is in NL.
This proves item 1.
Proof of items 2 and 3.
Assume that, for a given pair (s1, q1), one can determine in NL whether (s1, q1) is negatively
deciding.
Then we can check in NL whether the belief B is not negatively deciding: guess (s1, q1) ∈ B
nondeterministically and check whether (s1, q1) is not negatively deciding. The latter can
be done in NL, as NL is closed under complement. It follows that one can check in NL
whether B is negatively deciding.
Under the same assumption we can check in NL whether the observation prefix υ is
negatively deciding: By Lemma 4.2 we have that υ is not negatively deciding if and only
if ∆(B0, υ) is not negatively deciding. The latter can be checked in NL by following
nondeterministically a path in G from (s0, q0, υ) to a node (s1, q1, ε) and then checking
if (s1, q1) is not negatively deciding. It follows that one can check in NL whether υ is
negatively deciding.
The same reasoning applies when “negatively deciding” is replaced with “positively deciding”.
Therefore, for items 2 and 3, it remains to show that one can determine in NL whether a
given pair (s1, q1) is negatively (positively, respectively) deciding. We have:
(s1, q1) is not negatively deciding
⇐⇒ Prs1(Lq1) > 0
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ s2 : M(u)(s1, s2) > 0 and δ(q1, u) = f
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ s2 : ∆({(s1, q1)}, u) 3 (s2, f)
The latter can be checked in NL by nondeterministically guessing a word u letter-by-letter
and by nondeterministically following, in the belief NFA, a path that is labelled by u and
leads from (s1, q1) to a node (s2, f). This proves item 2.
For item 3 it remains to show how to determine in NL whether a given pair (s1, q1) is
positively deciding. We have:
(s1, q1) is not positively deciding
⇐⇒ Prs1(Lq1) < 1
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ s2.∃ q2 : M(u)(s1, s2) > 0, δ(q1, u) = q2, Prs2(Lq2) = 0
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ (s2, q2) ∈ ∆({(s1, q1)}, u) : (s2, q2) is negatively deciding
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ (s2, q2) ∈ ∆({(s1, q1)}, u) : (s2, q2) is negatively deciding,
|u| ≤ |S ×Q|
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most |S ×Q| different pairs of
the form (s, q). Therefore, one can check in NL whether (s1, q1) is not positively deciding:
1. nondeterministically guess a word u letter-by-letter;
2. nondeterministically follow, in the belief NFA, a path that is labelled by u and leads from
(s1, q1) to a node (s2, q2);
3. check that (s2, q2) is negatively deciding; we have shown previously that this can be done
in NL.
This proves item 3.
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Proof of item 4.
By Lemma 4.4 it suffices to prove membership in PSPACE for the case where a belief B is
given. For all B ⊆ S ×Q, define:
VB := {uw | ∆(B, u) is deciding}
We first prove the following claim:
Claim. For given s and B ⊆ S ×Q one can determine in PSPACE whether Prs(VB) = 0.
We prove the claim. We have:
Prs(VB) > 0
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, ∆(B, u) is deciding
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, ∆(B, u) is deciding, |u| ≤ 2|S×Q|
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most 2|S×Q| different beliefs of
the form ∆(B, u). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether Prs(VB) > 0:
1. guess a word u = a1 · · · an with n ≤ 2|S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are states
s1, . . . , sn with M(a1)(s, s1) > 0 and M(ai+1)(si, si+1) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1};
2. compute, on the fly, the belief B′ := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · ·∆(∆(B, a1), a2) · · · an);
3. check that B′ is deciding; we have shown in items 2 and 3 that this can be done in
polynomial time.
Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved the claim.
Towards item 4, let B be any belief. We have:
B is confused
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ B : Prs(VB) < 1
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ B. ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, Prs′(V∆(B,u)) = 0
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ B. ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, Prs′(V∆(B,u)) = 0,
|u| ≤ |S| · 2|S×Q|
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most |S| · 2|S×Q| different pairs
of the form (s′,∆(B, u)). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether B is
confused:
1. guess a word u = a1 · · · an with n ≤ |S| · 2|S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are
states s1, . . . , sn withM(a1)(s, s1) > 0 andM(ai+1)(si, si+1) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1};
2. compute, on the fly, the belief B′ := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · ·∆(∆(B, a1), a2) · · · an);
3. check that Prsn(VB′) = 0; we have shown in the claim above that this can be done
in PSPACE.
Proof of item 5.
By Lemma 4.5 it suffices to prove membership in PSPACE for the case where a belief B is
given. We have:
B is not very confused
⇐⇒ ∃u : ∆(B, u) 6= ∅ is deciding definition
⇐⇒ ∃u : ∆(B, u) 6= ∅ is deciding, |u| ≤ 2|S×Q|
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The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most 2|S×Q| different beliefs of
the form ∆(B, u). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether B is not very
confused:
1. guess a word u with |u| ≤ 2|S×Q| letter-by-letter and compute, on the fly, the belief
B′ := ∆(B, u);
2. check that B′ 6= ∅ and B′ is deciding; we have shown in items 2 and 3 that this can be
done in polynomial time.
Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved item 5.
Proof of item 6.
By Lemma 4.6 it suffices to prove membership in PSPACE for the case where a belief B is
given. The proof is analogous to the one of item 4. We abbreviate “deciding or very confused”
to “dv”. For all B ⊆ S ×Q, define:
WB := {uw | ∆(B, u) is dv}
We first prove the following claim:
Claim. For given s and B ⊆ S ×Q one can determine in PSPACE whether Prs(WB) = 0.
We prove the claim. We have:
Prs(WB) > 0
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, ∆(B, u) is dv
⇐⇒ ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, ∆(B, u) is dv, |u| ≤ 2|S×Q|
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most 2|S×Q| different beliefs of the
form ∆(B, u). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether Prs(WB) > 0:
1. guess a word u = a1 · · · an with n ≤ 2|S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are states
s1, . . . , sn with M(a1)(s, s1) > 0 and M(ai+1)(si, si+1) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1};
2. compute, on the fly, the belief B′ := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · ·∆(∆(B, a1), a2) · · · an);
3. check that B′ is dv; we have shown in items 2, 3 and 5 that this can be done in PSPACE.
Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved the claim.
Towards item 6, let B be any belief. We have:
B is not finitary
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ B : Prs(WB) < 1
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ B. ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, Prs′(W∆(B,u)) = 0
⇐⇒ ∃ (s, q) ∈ B. ∃u.∃ s′ : M(u)(s, s′) > 0, Prs′(W∆(B,u)) = 0,
|u| ≤ |S| · 2|S×Q|
The last equivalence follows from the fact that there are at most |S| · 2|S×Q| different pairs
of the form (s′,∆(B, u)). Therefore, one can check in NPSPACE = PSPACE whether B is
not finitary:
1. guess a word u = a1 · · · an with n ≤ |S| · 2|S×Q| letter-by-letter and check that there are
states s1, . . . , sn withM(a1)(s, s1) > 0 andM(ai+1)(si, si+1) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1};
2. compute, on the fly, the belief B′ := ∆(B, u) = ∆(· · ·∆(∆(B, a1), a2) · · · an);
3. check that Prsn(WB′) = 0; we have shown in the claim above that this can be done
in PSPACE.
Since PSPACE is closed under complement, we have proved item 6. J
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Here is Proposition 7 from the main body:
I Proposition 7. There exists a diagnoser if and only if ε is not confused.
Proof. We have:
there exists a diagnoser
⇐⇒ there exists a policy that decides almost surely definition of diagnoser
⇐⇒ • decides almost surely Lemma 1
⇐⇒ Pr({w | w has a deciding prefix} = 1 definitions
⇐⇒ ε is not confused definition of confused
J
B.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Here is Theorem 8 from the main body:
I Theorem 8 (cf. [4, Theorem 6]). Given an MCM and a DFA A, it is PSPACE-complete
to check if there exists a diagnoser.
Proof. By Proposition 7 it suffices to show PSPACE-completeness of checking whether ε is
confused. Membership in PSPACE follows from Lemma 5.4.
For hardness we reduce from the following problem: given an NFA U over Σ = {a, b}
where all states are initial and accepting, does U accept all (finite) words? This problem is
PSPACE-complete [16, Lemma 6]. Let U = (Q,Σ, δ, Q,Q) be the given NFA. We construct
an MCM = (Q∪ {s0, s1, s2},Σ∪ {#},M, s0) where s0, s1, s2 6∈ Q, and # 6∈ Σ = {a, b}, and
the transitions are as follows:
s0Q s1s2
1
2|Q|a 12a
1
2a
1
2b
1
x(q)#
1#
In this picture, the rectangle labelled with Q indicates states and transitions that involve
the states in Q, i.e., those coming from the NFA U . In more detail we define:
M(a)(s0, q) := 12|Q| for all q ∈ Q;
x(q) := |δ(q, a) ∪ δ(q, b)|+ 1 for all q ∈ Q;
M(σ)(q, q′) := 1x(q) for all q ∈ Q and both σ ∈ {a, b} and all q′ ∈ δ(q, σ);
M(#)(q, s2) := 1x(q) for all q ∈ Q.
Define A to be a DFA that accepts L = Σ∗{#}(Σ ∪ {#})∗. We show that ε is confused if
and only if U accepts all words.
Suppose U does not accept the word u ∈ Σ∗. Then one of the following two events
happens almost surely, depending on whetherM takes the left or the right transition in the
first step:
M emits au0# for some u0 ∈ Σ∗;
M emits au0u for some u0 ∈ Σ∗.
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We claim that both au0# and au0u are deciding, implying that ε is not confused. It is clear
that au0# is positively deciding. We argue that au0u is negatively deciding. Indeed, since U
does not accept u, we have δ(q, u) = ∅ for all q ∈ Q. Hence, starting from any q ∈ Q, the
MCM cannot emit u. So ifM emits au0u, it must have taken the right transition in the
first step and thus will never emit #, which means that au0u is negatively deciding.
Conversely, suppose that ε is not confused. Then, almost surely, M emits a deciding
prefix u′. By our construction, the word u′ is positively deciding with probability 12 , and
negatively deciding with probability 12 (depending on which transitionM takes in the first
step). Hence there exists u ∈ Σ∗ such that au is negatively deciding. So M cannot take
the left transition in the first step and then emit u. It follows that there is no q ∈ Q with
δ(q, u) 6= ∅, i.e., U does not accept u. J
B.6 Proof of Proposition 9
Here is Proposition 9 from the main body:
I Proposition 9. A feasible observation policy does not allow confusion.
Proof. Suppose that ρ allows confusion, i.e., with positive probability, it produces an
observation prefix υ⊥ such that υ⊥ is confused but υ is not. We have:
Pr({w & υ | • decides w})
= Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, uw has a deciding prefix}) definitions
≥ Pr({uw | u ∼ υ, υw has a deciding prefix})
= Pr({uw | u ∼ υ}) υ is not confused
= Pr({w & υ}) definition of &
(5)
Thus we have:
Pr({w | • decides w, ρ does not decide w})
≥ Pr({w & υ | • decides w, ρ does not decide w})
≥ Pr({w & υ | ρ does not decide w}) by (5)
= Pr({w & υ⊥ | ρ does not decide w})
= Pr({uw | u ∼ υ⊥, ρ does not decide w}) definition of &
= Pr({uw | u ∼ υ⊥, piρ(uw) has no deciding prefix}) definition of decide
≥ Pr({uw | u ∼ υ⊥, υ⊥w has no deciding prefix}) definition of ρ
> 0 υ⊥ is confused
Hence ρ is not feasible. J
B.7 Proof of Lemma 10
Here is Lemma 10 from the main body:
I Lemma 10. If ε is finitary then Ex(C◦) is finite.
Proof. We abbreviate “deciding or very confused” to “dv”. Note that if a belief B is dv then
all ∆(B, a) are dv. We use this to show the following similar property:
Claim. For any finitary belief B, all ∆(B, a) are finitary.
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We prove the claim. Let B be a finitary belief. Then we have:
1 = Prs({uw | ∆(B, u) is dv})
=
∑
a∈Σ
∑
s′
M(a)(s, s′) · Prs′({uw | ∆(B, au) is dv})
Here, the second equality follows from the property of dv mentioned above. Hence, for all
a ∈ Σ and all (s′, q′) ∈ ∆(B, a) we have Prs′({uw | ∆(B, au) is dv}) = 1, so ∆(B, a) is
finitary for all a. This proves the claim.
Define:
F := {(s,B) ∈ S × 2S×Q | B finitary, ∃ q : (s, q) ∈ B}
For any belief B define:
edv(B) :=
{
1 if B is dv
0 otherwise
(6)
For any (s,B) ∈ F and any n ∈ N define
cn(s,B) := Exs
(
1−DB,n
)
, (7)
where by Exs we denote the expectation with respect to Prs and we define DB,n(w) :=
edv(∆(B, un)) where un is the length-n prefix of w. We have c0(s,B) = 1− edv(B). Further,
due to the claim above, we have for all n ∈ N:
cn+1(s,B) =
∑
a∈Σ
∑
s′
M(a)(s,s′)>0
M(a)(s, s′) · cn(s′,∆(B, a))
We may write those equations in vector form:
cT0 = 1T − eTdv
cTn+1 = U · cTn
(8)
where
edv ∈ {0, 1}F where edv(s,B) = edv(B) as in (6);
cn ∈ RF where cn(s,B) is as in (7);
U ∈ [0, 1]F×F where
U((s,B), (s′, B′)) =

∑
a∈Σ
∆(B,a)=B′
M(a)(s, s′) if B is not dv
0 otherwise.
The matrix U satisfies U1T = 1T − eTdv. By a straightforward induction it follows:
Un1T = 1T −
n−1∑
i=0
U ieTdv for all n ∈ N (9)
From the definition of finitary, for all (s,B) ∈ F there is u such that Prs({u}Σω) > 0 and
∆(B, u) is dv. It follows that there is n ∈ N such that∑n−1i=0 U ieTdv > 0T where the inequality
is strict in all entries. By (9), we have Un1T < 1T where the inequality is strict in all entries.
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Hence the spectral radius of U is less than one, and so the matrix series
∑∞
n=0 U
n converges
to a finite matrix, say U∗ ∈ RF×F .
Suppose ε is finitary. By Lemma 4.6, the belief B0 = ∆(B0, ε) is finitary. Hence
(s0, B0) ∈ F . Further we have:
Ex(C◦) =
∞∑
n=0
Ex
(
1−Dn
)
by (1)
=
∞∑
n=0
Exs0
(
1−DB0,n
)
def. of Dn, DB0,n, Lemma 4
=
∞∑
n=0
cn(s0, B0) by (7)
=
∞∑
n=0
(
Un
(
1T − eTdv
))
(s0, B0) by (8)
=
(
U∗
(
1T − eTdv
))
(s0, B0) definition of U∗
< ∞ U∗ is finite
This completes the proof. J
B.8 Proof of Lemma 11
Here is Lemma 11 from the main body:
I Lemma 11. Let ρ be a feasible observation policy. If Pr(Cρ <∞) = 1 then ε is finitary.
Proof. Let ρ be an observation policy. Suppose ε is not finitary and Pr(Cρ <∞) = 1. We
show that ρ is not feasible.
Observe that for any w, if Cρ(w) <∞ then there is a (unique) shortest finite prefix of w,
say u˜(w), such that ρ never observes a letter after u˜(w). Abbreviating “deciding or very
confused” to “dv”, we have:
0 < Pr({w | no prefix of w is dv}) ε is not finitary
= Pr({w | no prefix of w is dv, Cρ(w) <∞}) Pr(Cρ <∞) = 1
= Pr({uw | no prefix of uw is dv, u = u˜(uw)}) observation above
≤ Pr({uw | u is not dv, u = u˜(uw)}) u is a prefix of uw
=
∑
u is not dv
Pr({uw | u = u˜(uw)}) Σ∗ is countable
It follows that there is u that is (i) not deciding, (ii) not very confused, and (iii) such that
ρ never observes a letter after u. Since u is not very confused, there is u′ such that uu′ is
enabled and deciding. Hence • decides all words of the form uu′w. Since ρ never observes a
letter after u, we have that ρ does not decide any words of the form uu′w. It follows:
Pr({w | • decides w, ρ does not decide w})
≥ Pr({uu′w | • decides uu′w, ρ does not decide uu′w})
= Pr({uu′w}) as explained above
> 0 uu′ is enabled
Hence ρ is not feasible. J
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B.9 Proof of Proposition 12
Here is Proposition 12 from the main body:
I Proposition 12. cinf is finite if and only if ε is finitary.
Proof. Suppose ε is finitary. By Lemma 10 we then have that Ex(C◦) is finite. Hence
cinf ≤ Ex(C◦) is finite.
Conversely, suppose ε is not finitary. By Lemma 11 we then have Pr(Cρ =∞) > 0 for all
feasible observation policies. Thus Ex(Cρ) = ∞ holds for all feasible observation policies.
Hence cinf =∞. J
B.10 Proof of Proposition 13
Here is Proposition 13 from the main body:
I Proposition 13. If a diagnoser exists then cinf is finite.
Proof. We have:
a diagnoser exists
⇐⇒ ε is not confused Prop. 7
⇐⇒ Pr({w | some prefix of w is deciding}) = 1 definition
=⇒ Pr({w | some prefix of w is deciding or very confused}) = 1
⇐⇒ ε is finitary definition
⇐⇒ cinf is finite Prop. 12
J
B.11 Proof of Theorem 14
Here is Theorem 14 from the main body:
I Theorem 14. It is PSPACE-complete to check if cinf <∞.
Proof. By Proposition 12 it suffices to show PSPACE-completeness of checking whether ε is
finitary. Membership in PSPACE follows from Lemma 5.6.
For hardness we use the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 8. There we reduce
from the following PSPACE-complete problem: given an NFA U over Σ = {a, b} where all
states are initial and accepting, does U accept all (finite) words? The reduction produces an
MCM and a DFA A.
First we show that in the result of that reduction, no enabled word is very confused. If
a word u contains the letter # then u is negatively deciding, hence not very confused. Let
u0 ∈ Σ∗.
If the NFA U accepts all words then au0# is enabled and positively deciding;
if B does not accept some word u then au0u is enabled and negatively deciding.
In either case it follows that au0 is not very confused and also that ε is not very confused.
We conclude that no enabled word is very confused.
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Thus we have:
ε is finitary
⇐⇒ Pr({w | no prefix of w is deciding or very confused}) = 0 definition
⇐⇒ Pr({w | no prefix of w is deciding}) = 0 as argued
⇐⇒ ε is not confused definition
⇐⇒ NFA U does not accept all words ,
where the last equivalence was shown in the proof of Theorem 8. It follows that checking if
cinf is finite is PSPACE-complete. J
B.12 Wrong Proof of Theorem 15
Here is Theorem 15 from the main body:
I Theorem 15. It is undecidable to check if cinf < 3, even when a diagnoser exists.
First we give a wrong proof. This proof contains useful ideas and is similar to and simpler
than the correct one, but is flawed. We point out the flaw. In §B.13 we amend the proof,
making it more complicated but correct. The incorrect proof contains only ideas that feature
also in the correct one; but the correct proof can be read without having read the incorrect
one.
Wrong proof. We reduce from the emptiness problem for probabilistic automata. A prob-
abilistic automaton (PA) is a tuple P = (S,Σ,M, s0, η) where S is a finite set of states, Σ
is a finite alphabet, the mapping M : Σ → [0, 1]S×S , where M(a) is stochastic for each
a ∈ Σ, specifies the transitions, s0 is an initial state, and η ∈ [0, 1]S is a vector of acceptance
probabilities. Extend M to M : Σ∗ → [0, 1]S×S as in the case of MCs. In the case of
PAs, M(u) is stochastic for each u ∈ Σ∗. For each u define PrP(u) := es0M(u)η>. The
probability PrP(u) can be interpreted as the probability that P accepts u. The emptiness
problem asks, given a PA P, whether there is u such that PrP(u) > 12 . This problem is
undecidable [?, p. 190, Theorem 6.17].
Let P = (SP ,ΣP ,MP , s0P , η) be the given PA. We will construct a DFA A and an MCM
over the alphabet Σ := ΣP ∪ {0, 1, ?}, where 0, 1, ? are fresh letters. Define A to be a DFA
that accepts L = 0(ΣΣ)∗Σ1Σω. We might characterize L by saying that 1 appears on an
odd position.
We construct an MCM = (S,Σ,M, s0) with
S := {s0} ∪ (SP × {0, 1, 2, 3}) ,
such that s0 is a fresh state. The MC M initially splits randomly into a “0-copy” (with
states in S × {0, 2}) and a “1-copy” (with states in S × {1, 3}), in either case emitting the
letter 0. Formally, M(0)(s0, (s0P , 0)) = M(0)(s0, (s0P , 1)) = 12 . The MCM is constructed
such that if it goes into the 0-copy then surely it emits an infinite word that is not in L; and
if it goes into the 1-copy then almost surely it emits an infinite word in L. Therefore, for an
observation policy it suffices to identify which copyM has entered.
The transitions inM depend on MP and η. In Figure 2 we illustrate this dependence
with an example, where ΣP = {a, b}. For all s, t ∈ SP and both i ∈ {0, 1} we have the
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st1
t2
t3
t4
a
b
1
7
6
7
1
5
4
5
(s, 0) (s, 2)
2η(s)
3 0
3−2η(s)
3 ?
(t1, 0)
(t2, 0)
(t3, 0)
(t4, 0)
1·1
3·7a
1·1
6·70
1·6
3·7a
1·6
6·70
1·1
3·5b
1·1
6·50
1·4
3·5b
1·4
6·50
(s, 1) (s, 3)
2η(s)
3 1
3−2η(s)
3 ?
(t1, 1)
(t2, 1)
(t3, 1)
(t4, 1)
1·1
3·7a
1·1
6·71
1·6
3·7a
1·6
6·71
1·1
3·5b
1·1
6·51
1·4
3·5b
1·4
6·51
Figure 2 Illustration of the wrong reduction. The PA at the top has a state s whose outgoing
transitions are such that M(a)(s, t1) = 17 , M(a)(s, t2) =
6
7 , M(b)(s, t3) =
1
5 , M(b)(s, t4) =
4
5 . The
resulting MC has two corresponding states, (s, 0) and (s, 1). From such a state (s, i) it first emits,
with a probability depending on η(s), either the letter i (thus giving away in which copy the MC is)
or the letter ?, and then emits, with probability 13 , the letter i (thus giving away in which copy the
MC is), or, with probability 23 · 1|ΣP | =
1
3 each, the letters a or b.
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following transitions:
M(a)((s, i+ 2), (t, i)) := 23 ·
1
|ΣP | ·MP(a)(s, t) ∀ a ∈ ΣP
M(i)((s, i+ 2), (t, i)) := 13 ·
1
|ΣP | ·
∑
a∈ΣP
MP(a)(s, t)
Note that any state (s, i+2) emits, with probability 13 , the letter i (thus giving away in which
copyM is), or, with probability 23 , a letter in ΣP that is chosen uniformly at random. (Thus,
if |ΣP | = 2, all letters in ΣP ∪ {i} have probability 13 .) In more detail, one can view the
behaviour ofM in a state (s, i+2) as follows: M first samples a letter a from ΣP uniformly at
random, then samples a successor state from S×{i} (each (t, i) with probabilityMP(a)(s, t)),
and then, upon transitioning to (t, i), emits, with probability 23 , the sampled letter a, or,
with probability 13 , the letter i. This completes the description of the construction.
There exists a diagnoser: Consider the policy ρ, which, after the initial 0, observes every
2nd letter; each time this letter will be either from ΣP (with probability 23 ) or from {0, 1} (with
probability 13 ). With probability 1 the latter case occurs eventually. Once it has occurred,
the copy has been revealed; thus the observation prefix becomes deciding and ρ stops making
any observations. The required number of observations under ρ is geometrically distributed,
with expectation 1/ 13 = 3. Hence Ex(Cρ) = 3 and thus cinf ≤ 3.
It remains to show that cinf < 3 if and only if there is u such that PrP(u) > 12 . Suppose
u0 is such that PrP(u0) > 12 . Consider the following policy ρ0:
do not observe the initial 0 and then observe every 2nd letter until either the prefix is
deciding (because 0 or 1 has been observed) or the observation prefix becomes equal
to u0;
in the former case: stop observing forever;
in the latter case: observe the immediately following letter;
if this letter is 0 or 1 then the observation prefix has become deciding, so stop observing;
if this letter is ? then observe the next letter and then every 2nd letter as before.
This policy coincides mostly with the diagnoser ρ described above. It only deviates if and
when u0 has been observed. One can show that this deviation improves the expected cost:
the conditional probability that 0 or 1 (hence not the letter ?) will be observed conditioned
under having observed u0 is equal to 23 · PrP(u0) > 23 · 12 > 13 . It follows that cinf < 3.
It remains to show the converse. To this end, suppose all u satisfy PrP(u) ≤ 12 . Then
one is tempted to think that it is not beneficial to deviate from the diagnoser ρ described
above: conditioned under having observed some observation prefix u using ρ, the conditional
probability that the immediately following letter is 0 or 1 (hence not the letter ?) is equal to
2
3 · PrP(u) ≤ 23 · 12 ≤ 13 , so not better than what one would get by proceeding with ρ.
The last argument is flawed though; it is valid only for the very first deviation from ρ.
Indeed, suppose there is some u0 with PrP(u0) = 12 . Suppose further we follow ρ until the
observation prefix is u0. At this point it does not come with a risk to observe the immediately
following letter, as the probability to observe 0 or 1 is 13 , which is equal to the success
probability of each single observation of ρ. Suppose we do that and observe ?. Now we have
not learned anything about which copy the MC is in; however, after this observation, the
conditional probability (conditioned on all observations so far) that we are in a state (s, 2)
or (s, 3) with low η(s) has increased, as a state (s, i) with high η(s) would probably have
produced the letter i instead of ?. This information might be exploitable later: For instance,
suppose that the PA is such that states s with low and high values of η(s) alternate. Then
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in the next round we believe to be in a state (s, i) with high η(s). Now it might be beneficial
to make another non-ρ observation, even if PrP(u0a) ≤ 12 holds for all a ∈ ΣP .
To fix this problem we need to change the construction in a way that a single deviation
from ρ leaks less information. We do this in the following §B.13. J
B.13 Correct Proof of Theorem 15
Here is Theorem 15 from the main body:
I Theorem 15. It is undecidable to check if cinf < 3, even when a diagnoser exists.
Proof. We reduce from the emptiness problem for probabilistic automata. A probabilistic
automaton (PA) is a tuple P = (S,Σ,M, s0, η) where S is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite
alphabet, the mapping M : Σ→ [0, 1]S×S , where M(a) is stochastic for each a ∈ Σ, specifies
the transitions, s0 is an initial state, and η ∈ [0, 1]S is a vector of acceptance probabilities.
Extend M to M : Σ∗ → [0, 1]S×S as in the case of MCs. In the case of PAs, M(u) is
stochastic for each u ∈ Σ∗. For each u define PrP(u) := es0M(u)η>. The probability PrP(u)
can be interpreted as the probability that P accepts u. The emptiness problem asks, given
a PA P, whether there is u such that PrP(u) > 12 . This problem is undecidable [?, p. 190,
Theorem 6.17].
We assume that for all u there is s with M(u)(s0, s) > 0 and 0 < η(s) < 1. This is
without loss of generality, as we can make the PA branch, in its first transition and with
positive probability, to a sub-PA with a single state from which every word is accepted
with probability 12 . Formally, from the original PA P = (S,Σ,M, s0, η) obtain another PA
P ′ = (S′ ∪ {t0, t},Σ,M ′, t0, η′) where:
t0, t are fresh states;
η′(t0) := η(s0) and η′(t) := 12 and η′(s) := η(s) for all s;
M ′(a)(t0, t) := 12 and M ′(a)(t, t) := 1 for all a ∈ Σ;
M ′(a)(t0, s) := 12M(a)(s0, s) for all a ∈ Σ and all s;
M ′(a)(s, s′) = M(a)(s, s′) for all s, s′.
We have for all u that PrP′(u)− 12 = 12 (PrP(u)− 12 ). It follows that PrP(u) > 12 if and only
if PrP′(u) > 12 .
Let P = (SP ,ΣP ,MP , s0P , η) be the given PA. We will construct a DFA A and an MCM
over the alphabet Σ := ΣP ∪ {0, 1}, where 0, 1 are fresh letters. Define A to be a DFA that
accepts L = 0(ΣΣΣΣΣ)∗ΣΣΣΣ1Σω. Ignoring the very first letter 0, we might characterize L
by saying that 1 appears on a position that is divisible by 5.
We construct an MCM = (S,Σ,M, s0) with
S := {s0} ∪ (SP × {0, 1, 2, 3}) ∪ S˜ ,
such that s0 and the states in S˜ are fresh states. The MCM initially splits randomly into a
“0-copy” (with states in S × {0, 2}) and a “1-copy” (with states in S × {1, 3}), in either case
emitting the letter 0. Formally, M(0)(s0, (s0P , 0)) = M(0)(s0, (s0P , 1)) = 12 . The MCM is
constructed such that if it goes into the 0-copy then surely it emits an infinite word that
is not in L; and if it goes into the 1-copy then almost surely it emits an infinite word in L.
Therefore, for an observation policy it suffices to identify which copyM has entered.
The transitions inM depend on MP and η. In Figure 3 we illustrate this dependence
with an example, where ΣP = {a, b}.
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st1
t2
t3
t4
a
b
1
7
6
7
1
5
4
5
(s, 0) (s, 2)
η(s)
4 0000, . . . ,
1−η(s)
4 1010
(t1, 0)
(t2, 0)
(t3, 0)
(t4, 0)
1·1
3·7a
1·1
6·70
1·6
3·7a
1·6
6·70
1·1
3·5b
1·1
6·50
1·4
3·5b
1·4
6·50
(s, 1) (s, 3)
η(s)
4 1100, . . . ,
1−η(s)
4 1011
(t1, 1)
(t2, 1)
(t3, 1)
(t4, 1)
1·1
3·7a
1·1
6·71
1·6
3·7a
1·6
6·71
1·1
3·5b
1·1
6·51
1·4
3·5b
1·4
6·51
Figure 3 Illustration of the reduction. The PA at the top has a state s whose outgoing transitions
are such that M(a)(s, t1) = 17 , M(a)(s, t2) =
6
7 , M(b)(s, t3) =
1
5 , M(b)(s, t4) =
4
5 . The resulting
MC has two corresponding states, (s, 0) and (s, 1). From such a state (s, i) it first emits, with a
probability depending on η(s), a 4-bit sequence (“block”), and then emits, with probability 13 , the
letter i (thus giving away in which copy the MC is), or, with probability 23 · 1|ΣP | =
1
3 each, the
letters a or b.
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Formally, for all (s, i) ∈ SP × {0, 1} we define transitions (using states in S˜ that are not
further specified) such that:
M(0000)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = η(s)/4 M(0101)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = (1− η(s))/4
M(0001)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = η(s)/4 M(0110)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = (1− η(s))/4
M(0010)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = η(s)/4 M(1001)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = (1− η(s))/4
M(0011)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = η(s)/4 M(1010)((s, 0), (s, 2)) = (1− η(s))/4
M(1100)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = η(s)/4 M(0100)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = (1− η(s))/4
M(1101)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = η(s)/4 M(0111)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = (1− η(s))/4
M(1110)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = η(s)/4 M(1000)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = (1− η(s))/4
M(1111)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = η(s)/4 M(1011)((s, 1), (s, 3)) = (1− η(s))/4
(10)
These 4-bit sequences (henceforth “blocks”) are chosen such that if the first two bits agree
(say they are both b ∈ {0, 1}) then M is in the b-copy; if the first two bits of a block do
not agree then the xor of all four bits (equivalently, the parity of the sum of the four bits)
identifies in which copyM is. States (s, i) with higher acceptance probability η(s) have a
higher chance to emit a block where the first two bits agree. The intention of this construction
is to make it cost-efficient for an observation policy to observe (some) letters of a block when
the policy believes that it is in a state (s, i) with high η(s). We will show later that this is
beneficial on some runs if and only if there is u with PrP(u) > 12 .
The other transitions ofM are as follows: For all s, t ∈ SP and both i ∈ {0, 1} we have
the following transitions:
M(a)((s, i+ 2), (t, i)) := 23 ·
1
|ΣP | ·MP(a)(s, t) ∀ a ∈ ΣP
M(i)((s, i+ 2), (t, i)) := 13 ·
1
|ΣP | ·
∑
a∈ΣP
MP(a)(s, t)
Note that any state (s, i+2) emits, with probability 13 , the letter i (thus giving away in which
copyM is), or, with probability 23 , a letter in ΣP that is chosen uniformly at random. (Thus,
if |ΣP | = 2, all letters in ΣP ∪ {i} have probability 13 .) In more detail, one can view the
behaviour ofM in a state (s, i+2) as follows: M first samples a letter a from ΣP uniformly at
random, then samples a successor state from S×{i} (each (t, i) with probabilityMP(a)(s, t)),
and then, upon transitioning to (t, i), emits, with probability 23 , the sampled letter a, or,
with probability 13 , the letter i. This completes the description of the construction.
There exists a diagnoser: Consider the policy ρ, which, after the initial 0, observes every
5th letter; each time this letter will be either from ΣP (with probability 23 ) or from {0, 1} (with
probability 13 ). With probability 1 the latter case occurs eventually. Once it has occurred,
the copy has been revealed; thus the observation prefix becomes deciding and ρ stops making
any observations. The required number of observations under ρ is geometrically distributed,
with expectation 1/ 13 = 3. Hence Ex(Cρ) = 3 and thus cinf ≤ 3.
It remains to show that cinf < 3 if and only if there is u such that PrP(u) > 12 . Suppose
u0 is such that PrP(u0) > 12 . Consider the following policy ρ0:
do not observe the initial 0 and then observe every 5th letter until either the prefix is
deciding (because 0 or 1 has been observed) or the observation prefix becomes equal
to u0;
in the former case: stop observing forever;
in the latter case: observe the first two letters of the following block;
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if they agree then the observation prefix has become deciding, so stop observing;
if they do not agree, observe also the next two letters; this produces a deciding prefix,
so stop observing.
This policy coincides mostly with the diagnoser ρ described above. It only deviates if and
when u0 has been observed. We show that this deviation improves the expected cost.
To argue in more formal terms, we extend (for the PA P) the mapping MP : Σ∗P →
[0, 1]SP×SP to MP : (ΣP ∪ {⊥})∗ → [0, 1]SP×SP by defining
MP(υ) :=
∑
u∼υ
MP(u)
/
|{u | u ∼ υ}| and define
µP(υ) := es0PMP(υ) .
One can view the distribution µP(υ) as the expected distribution after having fed the
PA P with a randomly sampled u ∼ υ. Similarly, we extend (for the MCM) the mapping
M : Σ∗ → [0, 1]S×S to M : Σ∗⊥ → [0, 1]S×S by defining
M(υ) :=
∑
u∼υ
M(u) and define
µ(υ) := es0M(υ)
es0M(υ)1T
.
One can view the distribution µ(υ) as the expected distribution after having observed υ.
Finally, for any finite word υ = o1o2 · · · on ∈ (ΣP ∪ {⊥})∗ define the following padding:
υ̂ :=
{
⊥ if n = 0
⊥⊥⊥⊥⊥o1⊥⊥⊥⊥o2⊥⊥⊥⊥o3 · · · ⊥⊥⊥⊥on if n ≥ 1
With these definitions, it is straightforward to check that we have:
1
2µP(υ)(s) = µ(υ̂)((s, 0)) = µ(υ̂)((s, 1)) ∀ υ ∈ (ΣP ∪ {⊥})
∗ ∀ s ∈ SP (11)
For the word u0 from above we have µP(u0)ηT = PrP(u0) > 12 . It follows from (11)
and (10) that, conditioned under prefix û0, the conditional probability of emitting 00 or 11
at the beginning of the following block is greater than 12 ; formally:
Pr({u00, u11}Σω | u ∼ û0} | {w & û0}) = µP(u0)ηT > 12
Recall that ρ0 is defined so that once it has observed û0, it makes either exactly 2 or exactly 4
further observations. From the previous inequality it follows for ρ0 that, conditioned under
observing û0, the conditional probability to make exactly 2 further observations is greater than
the conditional probability to make exactly 4 further observations. Hence, the conditional
expected number of observations after having observed u0 is less than 3.
More formally, for any policy ρ and an observation prefix υ = o1 · · · ok define a random
variable Cυρ by
Cυρ (w) := Cρ(w)−
|υ|−1∑
k=0
ρ(o1 . . . ok) for all w & υ ,
i.e., Cυρ is the number of observations that ρ makes after υ. By the argument above we have
Ex(C û0ρ0 | {w & û0}) < 3. For all u that are not prefixes of u0 we have Ex(C ûρ0 | {w & û}) = 3.
It follows Ex(Cρ0) < 3. Hence cinf < 3.
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It remains to show the converse. To this end, suppose all u satisfy PrP(u) ≤ 12 . It suffices
to show that all feasible policies ρ satisfy Ex(Cρ) ≥ 3.
In the following we use regular expressions to describe observation prefixes. For improved
readability we may indicate the borders of a block with a dot. For instance, the regular
expression
⊥(.⊥4.(ΣP +⊥))∗.0⊥⊥⊥.
indicates observation prefixes of the following form: first all observations (if any) are made
in non-blocks and are in ΣP (i.e., are not 0 or 1), and then 0 is observed at the beginning of
a block, and the other three letters in the block are not observed.
We call k ∈ (0 + 1 +⊥)4 block-deciding when k ∈ (0 + 1)4 + (00 + 11)(0 + 1 +⊥)2. We
have the following lemma:
I Lemma 29. Let υ be an observation prefix that is not deciding and satisfies |υ| = 1 + 5n
for some n ∈ N. Let k ∈ (0 + 1 +⊥)4. Then υ.k. is deciding if and only if k is block-deciding.
Proof of the lemma. Let υ and k be as in the statement. Suppose k is block-deciding. Then,
by inspecting (10), it follows that υ.k. is deciding.
Conversely, suppose k is not block-deciding. From the assumption made about P in the
beginning we obtain that there is s ∈ SP with 0 < η(s) < 1 such that M(υ)(s0, (s, 0)) > 0
and M(υ)(s0, (s, 1)) > 0. By inspecting (10), it follows that υ.k. is not deciding. J
Let ρ be any feasible policy, and let υ be an observation prefix that ρ produces with
positive probability.
1. Suppose υ ∈ ⊥(.⊥4.(ΣP +⊥))∗.k.(⊥5)∗(ΣP +⊥)(⊥5)∗.` where k ∈ (0 + 1 +⊥)4 is not
block-deciding, and ` ∈ (0 + 1 +⊥)≤4 has exactly one observation. By Lemma 29 the
prefix up to and including k is not deciding. Another application of Lemma 29 shows
that υ is not deciding, so Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1.
2. Suppose υ ∈ ⊥(.⊥4.(ΣP +⊥))∗.k.(⊥5)∗ΣP where k ∈ (0 + 1 +⊥)4 is not block-deciding.
Similarly as before, it follows that υ is not deciding.
Suppose the next observation that ρ makes is in a block. Then, by item 1, we have
Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + 1 = 2.
Otherwise the next observation is in a non-block. If this observation yields 0 or 1
(which happens with probability 13 ) then no further observation is needed; otherwise, a
further observation will be needed. So Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + 13 · 0 + 23 · 1 ≥ 53 .
Thus, in either case we have Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 53 .
3. Suppose υ ∈ ⊥(.⊥4.(ΣP +⊥))∗.k. where k ∈ (0 + 1 +⊥)4 is not block-deciding. Similarly
as before, it follows that υ is not deciding.
Suppose the next observation that ρ makes is in a block. Then, by item 1, we have
Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + 1 = 2.
Otherwise the next observation is in a non-block. If this observation yields 0 or 1
(which happens with probability 13 ) then no further observation is needed; otherwise,
the resulting observation prefix will have the form from item 2. It follows from item 2
that Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + 13 · 0 + 23 · 53 > 2.
Thus, in either case we have Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 2.
4. Suppose υ ∈ ⊥(.⊥4.(ΣP +⊥))∗.⊥⊥b for b ∈ {0, 1}. Then υ is not deciding.
Suppose the next observation is not in the same block. Then the resulting observation
prefix has the form from either item 1 or item 2. It follows from these items that
Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + min{1, 53} = 2.
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Otherwise the next observation follows immediately and yields b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The word
⊥⊥bb′ is not block-deciding, hence, by Lemma 29, υb′ is not deciding, so Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 2.
Thus, in either case we have Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 2.
5. Suppose υ ∈ ⊥(.⊥4.(ΣP +⊥))∗.bb′ for bb′ ∈ (0 + 1 +⊥)2 and bb′ 6∈ 00 + 11. Then υ is
not deciding.
Suppose the next observation is not in the same block. Then the resulting observation
prefix has the form from either item 1 or item 2. It follows from these items that
Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + min{1, 53} = 2.
Otherwise the next observation results in an observation prefix υυ′ with υ′ ∈
{0, 1,⊥0,⊥1}. No word in {bb′}{0⊥, 1⊥,⊥0,⊥1} is block-deciding. Hence, by
Lemma 29, υυ′ is not deciding, so Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 2.
Thus, in either case we have Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 2.
6. Suppose υ ∈ ⊥(.⊥4.(ΣP +⊥))∗.b for b ∈ {0, 1}. Then υ is not deciding.
Suppose the next observation is not in the same block. Then the resulting observation
prefix has the form from either item 1 or item 2. It follows from these items that
Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + min{1, 53} = 2.
Suppose the next observation is in the same block but does not follow immediately.
This results in an observation prefix υ⊥υ′ with υ′ ∈ {0, 1,⊥0,⊥1}. No word in
{b⊥}{0⊥, 1⊥,⊥0,⊥1} is block-deciding. Hence, by Lemma 29, υυ′ is not deciding, so
Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 2.
Otherwise the next observation follows immediately. Let υ0 be such that υ = υ0b.
Then there exists υ1 ∈ (ΣP ∪ {⊥})∗ with υ0 = υ̂1. Since all u ∈ Σ∗P satisfy µP(u)ηT =
PrP(u) ≤ 12 , we also have µP(υ1)ηT ≤ 12 . It follows from (11) and (10) that, conditioned
under prefix υ0, the conditional probability of emitting 00 or 11 is at most 12 ; formally:
p := Pr({u00, u11}Σω | u ∼ υ0} | {w & υ0}) = µP(υ1)ηT ≤ 12
For symmetry reasons we must have:
Pr({ub}Σω | u ∼ υ} | {w & υ}) = p ≤ 12
In words, the conditional probability that the next observation equals b is at most 12 .
If this happens then no further observation is needed, as bb⊥⊥ is block-deciding;
otherwise, the resulting observation prefix has the form from item 5. It follows from
item 5 that Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 + p · 0 + (1− p) · 2 ≥ 1 + 12 · 2 = 2.
Thus, in all three cases we have Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 2.
Let ρ be feasible. Call an observation prefix υ conventional when
υ is not deciding;
ρ produces υ with positive probability;
and υ does not contain observations in blocks.
Towards a contradiction, assume that Ex(Cρ) < 3. Then there exist a conventional observation
prefix υ and x > 0 such that:
Ex(Cυρ ) ≤ 3− x;
and for all conventional observation prefixes υ′ we have Ex(Cυ′ρ ) > 3− 32x.
Since ρ is feasible, there must be a non-⊥ observation (at some point) after υ.
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Suppose this next observation is in a non-block, resulting in an observation prefix υ′.
Then υ′ is either deciding (with probability 13 ) or conventional (with probability
2
3 ). It
follows:
3− x ≥ Ex(Cυρ ) ≥ 1 +
1
3 · 0 +
2
3 · Ex(C
υ′
ρ ) > 1 +
2
3 ·
(
3− 32x
)
= 3− x ,
which is a contradiction.
Otherwise, the next observation is in a block, resulting in an observation prefix υ′. Then
υ′ is not deciding and has the form of items 3–6 above. It follows from these items that
Ex(Cυρ ) = 1 + Ex(Cυ
′
ρ ) ≥ 1 + 2 = 3, contradicting that Ex(Cυρ ) ≤ 3− x.
In either case we have a contradiction. Hence Ex(Cρ) ≥ 3. J
B.14 Proof of Lemma 19
Here is Lemma 19 from the main body:
I Lemma 19. A belief B ⊆ S ×Q is confused if and only if there is a ∈ Σ such that ∆(B, a)
is not settled.
Proof. Since singleton beliefs cannot be confused in a non-hidden MC, we have:
Pr−→a ({uw | Pr−→au(Lδ(q,u)) ∈ {0, 1}}) = 1 ∀ a ∀ q (12)
Suppose ∆(B, a) is settled for all a. Then for all a and all (−→a , q1), (−→a , q2) ∈ ∆(B, a) and
all u with −→a u−→ we have:
Pr−→au(Lδ(q1,u)) = 1 ⇐⇒ Pr−→au(Lδ(q2,u)) = 1
By combining this with (12) we get:
Pr−→a ({uw | ∆(B, au) is deciding}) = 1 ∀ a
Hence:
Prs({uw | ∆(B, u) is deciding}) = 1 ∀ (s, q) ∈ B
Hence B is not confused.
Conversely, suppose there is a such that ∆(B, a) is not settled. Then there are
(−→a , q1), (−→a , q2) ∈ ∆(B, a) and u0 with −→a u0−→ such that:
Pr−−→au0(Lδ(q1,u0)) = 1 > Pr−−→au0(Lδ(q2,u0))
It follows from (12) that there is u1 with −→au0 u1−→ such that:
Pr−−−−→au0u1(Lδ(q1,u0u1)) = 1 > 0 = Pr−−−−→au0u1(Lδ(q2,u0u1))
Hence for all u2 with −−−→au0u1 u2−→ we have that (−−−−−→au0u1u2, δ(q1, u0u1u2)) is positively deciding
and (−−−−−→au0u1u2, δ(q2, u0u1u2)) is negatively deciding, and therefore also that
∆(B, au0u1u2) ⊇ {(−−−−−→au0u1u2, δ(q1, u0u1u2)), (−−−−−→au0u1u2, δ(q1, u0u1u2))}
is not deciding. So we have:
Pr−−−−→au0u1({u2w | ∆(B, au0u1u2) is deciding}) = 0
It follows that there is (s, q) ∈ B with
Prs({uw | ∆(B, u) is deciding}) < 1
Hence B is confused. J
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B.15 Proof of Lemma 25
Here is Lemma 25 from the main body:
I Lemma 25. Let c(K, s, q) denote the expected cost of decision under ρpro(K) starting in
(s, q). For each ε > 0 there exists K ∈ N such that for all (s, q) with cras(s, q) =∞ we have
c(K, s, q) ≤ 1 + ε.
Proof. Let (s, q) ∈ S ×Q. The singleton belief {(s, q)} cannot be confused in a non-hidden
MC, i.e., we have:
1 = Prs({uaw | (−→a , δ(q, ua)) is deciding})
It follows that for each p < 1 there is K ∈ N such that
p ≤ Prs({uaw | (−→a , δ(q, ua)) is deciding, |u| ≤ K})
= Prs({uaw | (−→a , δ(q, ua)) is deciding, |u| = K})
Suppose cras(s, q) =∞. Then for all k ∈ N the belief ∆({(s, q)},⊥k) is not confused, and so,
by Lemma 19, for all a the belief ∆({(s, q)},⊥ka) is settled. It follows that for each p < 1
there is K ∈ N such that
p ≤ Prs(ΣK{aw | ∆({(s, q)},⊥Ka) is deciding}) (13)
Since there are finitely many (s, q), it is also the case that for each p < 1 there is K ∈ N such
that for all (s, q) Equation (13) holds.
Let ε > 0. Choose K ∈ N such that (13) holds for p := 1/(1 + ε). Let (s, q) be such that
cras(s, q) =∞ and let X denote the random number of observations that ρpro(K) needs to
make starting in (s, q). From the argument above, we have Prs(X > 1) ≤ 1− p. Since for
the (random) pair (s′, q′) after the next observation (i.e., {(s′, q′)} = ∆({(s, q)},⊥Ka) for
the observed a) we have cras(s′, q′) =∞ again, it follows that Prs(X > i) ≤ (1− p)i holds
for all i ∈ N. Hence we have:
c(K, s, q) := Exs(X) =
∞∑
i=0
Prs(X > i) ≤
∞∑
i=0
(1− p)i = 1
p
= 1 + ε
J
B.16 Proof of Theorem 27
Here is Theorem 27 from the main body:
I Theorem 27. For any feasible policy ρ there is K ∈ N such that:
Ex(Cρpro(K)) ≤ Ex(Cρ)
Proof. Let ρ be a feasible policy. First we compare ρpro := ρpro(∞) with ρ. Let w be such
that all its prefixes are enabled. For n ∈ N, define υpro(n)(w) and υρ(n)(w) as the observation
prefixes obtained by ρpro and ρ, respectively, after n steps. (Thus, υpro(n)(w) and υρ(n)(w)
are, respectively, the length n prefixes of piρpro(w) and piρ(w).) We write `pro(n)(w) and
`ρ(n)(w) for the number of non-⊥ observations in υpro(n)(w) and υρ(n)(w), respectively.
Define Bpro(n)(w) := ∆(B0, υpro(n)(w)) and Bρ(n)(w) := ∆(B0, υρ(n)(w)). For beliefs B,B′
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we write B  B′ when for all (s, q) ∈ B there is (s′, q′) ∈ B′ with (s, q) ≈ (s′, q′). In the
following we suppress w in the notation to avoid clutter. We show for all w and all n ∈ N:
`pro(n) ≤ `ρ(n) and
(
Bpro(n)  Bρ(n) or `pro(n) < `ρ(n)
)
(14)
We proceed by induction on n. In the base case, n = 0, we have `pro(0) = 0 = `ρ(0) and
Bpro(0) = B0 = Bρ(0). For the inductive step, suppose (14) holds for n. (Note that, if
υ1 ∼ u and υ2 ∼ u and B1  B2 and |∆(B1, υ1)↓| ≤ 1, then ∆(B1, υ1)  ∆(B2, υ2).)
1. Suppose ρpro does not observe the (n+ 1)st letter. Then `pro(n+ 1) = `pro(n).
a. Suppose `pro(n+ 1) < `ρ(n+ 1). Then (14) holds for n+ 1.
b. Otherwise, `ρ(n + 1) ≤ `pro(n + 1) = `pro(n) ≤ `ρ(n) ≤ `ρ(n + 1) by the induction
hypothesis. So all these numbers are equal and we conclude that ρ does not observe the
(n+ 1)st letter either and that `pro(n) = `ρ(n). It follows by the induction hypothesis
that Bpro(n)  Bρ(n). Thus Bpro(n+ 1) = ∆(Bpro(n),⊥)  ∆(Bρ(n),⊥) = Bρ(n+ 1).
Hence (14) holds for n+ 1.
2. Otherwise ρpro observes the (n+ 1)st letter. From the definition of ρpro it follows that
Bpro(n+ 1) is settled and thus Bpro(n+ 1)  Bρ(n+ 1).
a. Suppose `pro(n) < `ρ(n). Then `pro(n + 1) ≤ `ρ(n) ≤ `ρ(n + 1), i.e., (14) holds for
n+ 1.
b. Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis, we have Bpro(n)  Bρ(n). Since ρpro observes
the (n+ 1)st letter, the belief ∆(Bpro(n),⊥) is confused. Since Bpro(n)  Bρ(n), the
belief ∆(Bρ(n),⊥) is also confused. Hence, by Lemma 4.4, υρ(n)⊥ is confused. By
Proposition 9, ρ does not allow confusion. So ρ observes the (n+ 1)st letter. Thus we
have `pro(n+ 1) = `pro(n) + 1 ≤ `ρ(n) + 1 = `ρ(n+ 1), where the inequality is by the
induction hypothesis. Hence (14) holds for n+ 1.
Thus we have shown (14).
Define I := {(s, q) | (s, q) is not deciding, cras(s, q) =∞}. We will choose K > |S|2 · |Q|2,
so, by Lemma 22, ρpro(K) coincides with ρpro(∞) until possibly ρpro(K) encounters a pair
(s, q) ∈ I. Define:
D := {w | ρpro(∞) does not encounter any element of I}
For each (s, q) ∈ I define:
E(s, q) := {w | (s, q) is the first element of I that ρpro(∞) encounters on w}
So D ∪⋃(s,q)∈I E(s, q) = Σω. We show Ex(Cρpro(K)) ≤ Ex(Cρ) by conditioning separately
on D and on each E(s, q) that has positive probability.
There is, by Lemma 23, almost surely a time, ndec, when ρpro(K) encounters a deciding
(s, q). In the event D, it follows Cρpro(K) = `pro(ndec); i.e., we have almost surely
Cρpro(K) = `pro(ndec)
by (14)
≤ `ρ(ndec) ≤ Cρ in the event D. (15)
Let (s, q) ∈ I and consider the event E(s, q). Let us write n for the time when ρpro(∞),
and thus ρpro(K), first encounters (s, q). Since (s, q) is not deciding, the belief Bpro(n) is
not deciding. Since ρpro(K) observes a letter at time n, the belief Bρ(n)  Bpro(n) is not
deciding either, and ρ needs to make at least one more observation. So we have almost surely
Cρ − `pro(n) ≥ `ρ(n) + 1− `pro(n)
by (14)
≥ 1 in the event E(s, q). (16)
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1. Suppose Ex(Cρ − `pro(n) | E(s, q)) ≤ 1. Then, by (16), we have Cρ = `ρ(n) + 1 almost
surely in the event E(s, q). Thus, almost surely in E(s, q), there exists k ∈ N such that
∆(Bρ,⊥ka)  ∆((s, q),⊥ka) is deciding for all a. It follows that there exists k ∈ N such
that ∆((s, q),⊥ka) is deciding for all a. We will choose K ≥ k, so ∆((s, q),⊥Ka) is
deciding for all a. Hence, by (14), we have Cρpro(K) = `pro(n) + 1 ≤ `ρ(n) + 1 = Cρ almost
surely in the event E(s, q).
2. Otherwise Ex(Cρ−`pro(n) | E(s, q)) > 1. It follows from Lemma 25 that one can chooseK
large enough so that Ex(Cρpro(K) − `pro(n) | E(s, q)) < Ex(Cρ − `pro(n) | E(s, q)). We
will choose K in this way, so that we have Ex(Cρpro(K) | E(s, q)) < Ex(Cρ | E(s, q)).
By choosing K large enough so that for each (s, q) ∈ I the respective constraint in item
1 or 2 is satisfied, we obtain Ex(Cρpro(K) | E(s, q)) ≤ Ex(Cρ | E(s, q)) for each (s, q) ∈ I.
Combining this with (15) yields the result. J
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